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CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION
1

The
Brazil,

marked an

1980's

exhilarating and yet trying time for Brazil
and Argentina. In

government was formally turned over

to civilian president Jose

twenty-one years of bureaucratic-authoritarian military
experienced liberation from

its

Two

rule.

Sarney

in

1985 after

years earlier, Argentina

notoriously oppressive military regime

known

as the

Proceso de Reorganization National (simply Proceso) which had
controlled every
Aigentine existence since 1976. Both nations

and

civil rights

still

harbored

bitter

facet of

memories from human

abuses committed during those administrations; Argentina

much more

so

with estimates of civilians murdered by the government ranging
anywhere from 6,000 to

30,000 while

in Brazil the

numbers approximated 300.

The re-emergence of civilian

rule in both Brazil

for those outside the military that they could

and Argentina brought new hope

once again determine

their

own

future.

Nevertheless, the armed forces, traditionally powerful, remained a viable entity
within the
socio-political

framework of both nations and,

examines the evolution of that

civil-military

thus,

needed

dynamic during

to be addressed. This thesis

the 1990's.

global transformations experienced since the end of the Cold
rise

of trade blocs, the world today

metamorfosis has,

in

many

Cognizant of

relations.

is

War including

the multiple

the ubiquitous

very different from that of the 1980's. This

respects, greatly influenced South

that change,

With

my work

American

civil-military

seeks to update the civil-military discussion

by answering the following central questions:

1

.

2

.

3

.

Is the military still a political actor?

Are

armed forces involvement?
economic globalization and neo-liberalism on the civil-

civilian institutions sufficiently strong to counter

What

is

the effect of

4.

dynamic?
Are remnants of authoritarianism

5

What

military

.

6.

is

still

prevalent?

the likelihood of another military government?

Do civilian

democracy and effective policy results as an "either
two concepts co-exist?
What do the above answers foretell for the future of democracy in Brazil and
leaders interpret

or" situation or can the

7

.

Argentina?
8.

Can any one model

accurately explain contemporary civil-military relations?

1

"If

going?

you do not know where you came from; how

Reflective of the

wisdom of this Hispanic

examination of the civil-military

literature

present. Writing chronologically,

military officer s psyche evolved

I

will

quote,

I

begin

this thesis

his early

how

the Brazilian

in

only what bureucratic-authoritarianism was, but also

South America. Finally,

I

to the

and Argentine

days as a representative of the king's

authority to the latter twentieth-century as a national
governor. In so doing,
light on, not

are

with an

and history from the colonial period

attempt to demonstrate

from

you know where you

hope

I

how and why

it

to

shed

emerged

close this historical chapter by introducing the various
schools

of thought on contemporary civil-military relations; a discussion
to which greater depth will

be afforded

in

chapters three and four.

Chapter three analyzes Brazil, the largest of

armed forces emerged from government
Argentina). During the

first five

all

Latin American nations. There the

as a relatively cohesive

body

(in

comparison

to

years after the official transition, that military unity, along

with an indirectly elected civilian president, perpetuated a tutelary model of
civil-military
relations.

However, with

the

dawn of the post-Cold War

era and the

first direct

presidential election in three decades in 1989, Brazilian civil-military relations

became much

more ambiguous. Some scholars have claimed

political

factor in that Portuguese-speaking nation.

challenged that assertion.

I

1

that the military

is

no longer a

However, economic and

political events

argue that the Brazilian armed forces, which

still

have

enjoy a

considerable degree of public sympathy, remain an important political actor, yet as an
interest group. Traditional national security/guardian

political discourse

and replaced by union-like demands

which have been addressed by the
however, not

new world

in their

for salary increases, benefits, etc.

civilian sphere through extensive bargaining. This

to say that the military

key discerning feature between
a

themes have been abandoned

cannot

this threat

still

and

be a vehicle of

that of

its

political intimidation.

past, is that

is,

The

with the emergence of

order, the threat has been harnessed and manipulated to a considerable extent

by the president. Nevertheless,

this relationship still highlights the

2

challenges inherent

in

Brazil

never

s

democratic consolidation. Without the strengthening
of

rid itself

its

may

institutions, Brazil

of the necessity to negotiate with the military.

Chapter four delves into the turbulent post- Authoritarian
Argentine experience. In
that country a discredited

utter

armed forces emerged from

shame. The war focused world attention on the

reputation for brutal internal repression.

the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands
military's

The Argentine armed

war

incompetence and on
forces quickly

in

its

became

a

domestic and international pariah. Internal military factions,
which had developed
concerning the direction of national government, became even
more polarized as a
the events of the early 1980's.

The Argentine

"transition

result of

by collapse" was a clear product

of that self-destruction. Unlike frustrated Brazilians, Argentine
civilians were too enraged

by the Pi oceso

to settle for indirect elections while the military

pent-up demand. The

first

was too weak

to contest that

post-authoritarian president, Raul Alfonsfn, felt he had a

popular mandate for pursuing democracy, with no need to bargain with the broken
armed
forces. Unfortunately, his passion for the respect of democratic institutions
sacrifice of decisive leadership.

A

the course of his presidency.

He allowed

came

at

a

the quest for civilian retribution to determine

society bent on justice, and in

many

cases, vengeance

pursued the military establishment into a corner. However, as Deborah Norden has noted:

"A

slightly

weakened group

[military]

system poses a greater threat

been incorporated

into

2

to that

which

adamantly opposed

to the existing political

system than a somewhat stronger group which has

Fighting for

it."

is

its

existence, the military

recomposed

itself

and

eventually forced the civilian president to negotiate.

Carlos Saul

Menem,

Alfonsfn's successor, had learned

Proceso president. He interpreted Alfonsfn's weakness

much from

the first post-

as a product of inflexibility.

Alfonsfn had adhered too faithfully to democratic principles that ultimately proved his
downfall.

Menem

powers only useful

viewed basic
if

they

tenets of liberal

moved

democracy such

the nation forward. Progress

as the separation of

is

what Argentina needed,

not necessarily democracy. That understanding would be key to explaining

3

Menem's

relations with the military
Brazil, those negotiations

by

Menem

to centralize

The
these

two

future of

which have perpetuated a bargaining function.
However, unlike
have not been due

and monopolize power

democracy

Can democracy
I

meant

to

'See

in Brazil

in the

weakness, rather

to

an attempt

executive

and Argentina

is

addressed

in the epilogue.

Can

nations, with long histories of regional and national
authoritarianism, forge a

lasting democratic course?

which

to institutional

offer a

Are democratic

civil-military relations

co-exist with authoritarianism? These are

all

governmental

priorities?

challenging questions for

number of equally challenging and complex answers.

My

responses are not

be ultimate conclusions, but merely a departure point for future
scholarly debate.

Wendy

Hunter, "Politicians Against Soldiers:

Contesting the Military

in Postauthoritarian

Brazil"

Comparative Politics (July 1995): pp.425-443. See also Patrice Franko,
"De Facto Demilitarization:
Budget-Driven Downsizing in Latin America," Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs 36 1

(Spring 1994):

pp.37-74.

"Deborah Norden, "Democratic Consolidation and Military Professionalism:
Journal of Interamerican Studies 32.3 (Fall 1990): pp. 151 -176.
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Argentina

in

the

1980's

"

CHAPTER 2
HISTORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

The

military in Latin

development and

politics.

In

With the transplantation of

Woild

in the late 1400's

America has long been an important

many

respects,

it

has written

of Latin American history.

the Spanish and Portuguese corporate system
to the

and early 1500's, the military occupied one of three

spheres of preeminence along with the Church and the
militar allowed the colonial

army

'self-governing' institution that

to

Elite.

was answerable only

to the 19th century),

"New

essential

That spatialization or fuero

become an "independent organism. ..that
to itself."

warranted within the context of unestablished centralized

America up

much

actor in the region's

1

acted as a

That autonomy,

states (as

was

initially

the case in Latin

would become a heavy burden once independence was

established and a formal state emerged.
In

South America, as discernible

states

began

to coalesce,

armies that had defined

and protected tenuous borders and nascent concepts of sovereignty
of the

state,

Military

became

and the

allow for the creation

increasingly institutionalized. However, Alain Rouquie, in The

State in Latin

America noted
,

that for Central

armed forces such an evolution was hampered by a
factors.

to

Rouquie explained

American and Caribbean

variety of domestic

and international

this distinction, writing:

For one, the needs of the economy seem to have been decisive in determining the
degree to which the skeleton of a state apparatus emerged. The growth of
externally oriented social forces integrated into the world market at the end of the
[19th] century presupposed political and social stability. ...The need for
socioeconomic organization, for the establishment of an infrastructure, and for the
expansion of services and of the public administration combined to build the state.

On

the other hand, in the nations that did not succeed in integrating themselves into

international trade at this period, and therefore lacked export products that would
permit the rise of a strong bourgeoisie and the appearance of an established social

power, the crystallization of the state was slow in coming. In such nations civil
convulsions were more prolonged and a national army never developed beyond the
2
stage of a private garrison with a state facade.

5

The geographic and economic challenges faced by Central
America and

the Caribbean,

along with the ever-present influence of the United
States and a Hispanic tradition of
personalistic politics maintained a praetorian guard
mentality within the militaries (or

national guards) of such nations as Nicaragua, the

Dominican Republic and Honduras.

These factors helped guarantee the tenure of such memorable
leaders/tyrants
Trujillo

who

ruled with

little fidelity

Graced by greater resources,

to

any concept of the

territory,

America were favored with a superior

"state

as

Somoza and

good."

and population, the nations of South

potential for development. They, in essence,

appeared to have a "greater calling." This sense of national destiny,
besides bolstering the

growth of the

state in the twentieth-century, contributed to the
political outlook of the

region's militaries.

As

their states

armed foices gained greater
the fertile

ground of the

became

increasingly consolidated, the South American

institutional cohesiveness. This

military's Aristotelian

new

cohesiveness,

sown

and Thomistic philosophy dating back

in

to the

fueros, soon blossomed into a distinctive nationalistic military ethos. South
American
militaries interpreted their strong sense of order

and loyalty

as the

embodiment of the

highest virtues of their emergent national societies. Military researcher Frederick Nunn,

The Time of the Generals, wrote

that the military, particularly in the chaotic political

economic environment of Latin America, saw
at the

same time

civil society

itself as "the

in

and

purest image of society ." 3 Yet,

the military also maintained a considerable degree of alienation from the

from which the members of

its

corps were drawn. In the armed forces'

interpretation of global hierarchy, soldiers ranked above civilians, with the abstract state as

supreme.

The importance of the
represents the reason for

its

state to

an organized national military

existence. Thus, the

armed forces have

is

obvious.

The

state

as their fundamental

mission the preservation of that entity; better known as national defense. However, what
the term "national defense" signifies in practice

the United States, the military

is

is

not necessarily uniform worldwide. In

generally looked upon as the protector of U.S. interests

6

abroad and the defender against foreign attack with
few instances of domestic involvement.

The South American armed
this century,

forces definition of "national defense"
prevalent for most of

however, reflected the region's Iberian

roots.

The

militaries of such nations

as Chile, Argentina, Brazil and Peru understood
their mission to be not only the
protection

of the state against foreign incursion but also the
preservation of a certain standard of moral

and/or political conduct upon the

state.

This broad guardian/arbiter role was concisely

explained by Argentine Major Venancio Carullo when he
stated: "the fatherland looks upon

army

the

as

its

sons, in

whom

it

has placed

its

honor,

its

integrity,

and

4

its life."

Chile in 1973 offered a vivid example of the ambiguous link
between the

"honor" and

state's

That year the Chilean military viewed democratically-elected

its "life."

President Allende's socialist reforms as "dishonorable." Thus,

it

felt justified in

making

the theoretical leap to interpreting those reforms as a threat to the
state therefore allowing
to

overthrow the

civil

government. Rouquie explains

apparent desire of the military to flee the state from

accomplish the goals of the

state

even against

its

by noting

this logic

civil society

will

and acting

permanent

many

in its defense."

entity with an

"threat" of

an occurrence
it

The

South

forces' perception of the state as a

immutable code of conduct contrasted with the

transitory,

and

in

its

own government,

in the

form of a coup

twentieth-century Latin America that

d'etat,

became so common

Howard Wiarda,

in 1978,

concluded

"could be considered. ..a 'normal,' or 'regular' part of the political process...." 6

dilemma

for civilian citizens

conduct appeared,
the

armed

in other

5

times less than ethical, nature of elected governments. This desire to "free the state"

from the

that

this century, highlight the

that, "the

allows the armed forces to

Allende episode, as well as the military overthrows of governments

American nations

it

armed

in

many

forces. Often

demands and

it

and

politicians

was

that the allegedly

The

immutable code of state

instances, to be an arbitrarily interpretable concept created by

was

difficult to discern

the "state good."

7

between the

military's

own

institutional

Samuel Huntington,
the

1957 The Soldier and the State, proposed
a solution

problem of military coups. Huntington suggested

form of stronger military

He

in his

Only

wrote:

if

instruction,

would

that greater professionalism, in
the

neutralize the military's political tendencies.

they [military] are motivated by military ideals,
will the armed forces be

the obedient servant of the state and will civilian
control be assured." 7

and Argentina, where the military was
and cohesive social
effect.

Samuel

to

entity, this

Fitch, in

move

in

many

respects the

in Brazil

most technologically advanced

to greater professionalization

Military Role Beliefs in Latin

However,

had a contradictory

American Democracies: Context,

Ideology, and Doctrine in Argentina and Ecuador," concluded
that unlike Huntington's

intended end, "[military role beliefs legitimizing the military's tutelary
role [were]

reproduced and generationally transmitted through the military school
8
system." The armed
forces, thus,

politics.

became even more

They viewed

isolated

from

"civil society as a

civil society

and more

critical

of civilian

divided world, dominated by self-interest and

disorder, and lacking in shared values." 9

With
from

the

Cold

civilian society

Brazil

and

War rise

of the National Security Doctrine the military's alienation

was only exacerbated. Alfred Stepan,

in

Rethinking Military Politics

:

the Southern Cone, notes:

...where the military

was highly

institutionalized, the perception of the threat to the

and the security of the military itself led to a focusing
of energies on the 'professionalization' of their approach to internal security. The
military institutions began to study such questions as the social and political
condition facilitating the growth of revolutionary protest and to develop doctrines
and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgency movements. As a result,
these highly professionalized armies became much more concerned with political
problems.
internal security of the nation

As

a result of that concern, the militaries of Brazil and Argentina during the latter half of the

twentieth century assumed an "integrated" professionalism."

armed forces saw

military control of the

and modernization."

government

12

8

Under

this

conception: "the

as a necessary step in nation-building

In his 1973

O Donnell

outlined

book Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism,
Guillermo

how

O’Donnell noted that
of more modernized

growth. This

the military's nation-building philosophy

in the 1960's

states,

phenomenon

&

became

1970's populist pressures on the

a political reality.

economic systems

such as Argentina and Brazil, outpaced actual economic
created a threat, be

actual or perceived, to the "propertied

it

classes" that the entire economic/political system

was

in

jeopardy. That fear, combined

with U.S.-led anti-subversive military training, O'Donnell argued, led the
military to
intervene in those two nations. These coups (Argentina: 1966

from those of the

distinct

philosophy of the

state's

the civilian sphere.

past.

They represented

preeminence and of the

&

1976; Brazil: 1964) were

the logical extrapolation of the military's
military's

own

Under Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (BA),

popular demands, but unlike previous transitional coups, the
they were better equipped than any civilian to govern

in the

inherent superiority over
the military restrained

BA armed forces decided that

long-term.

The

result of such a

perception was the twenty-one year military government in Brazil and the infamous seven

year Proceso

in

Argentina.

The emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarianism was testament
Brian

Loveman and Thomas

America point

out, Latin

Davies,

American

in

to the fact that, as

The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military

in

Latin

militaries thrived off an, ironically, very political notion

of being "anti-political." Only the armed forces

felt

political discourse in the best interest of the country.

capable of filtering the

Loveman and Davies

many

layers of

described the

military mentality, writing:

including the demagogic appeals by civilian politcians to the emerging
promoted class conflict and instability which 'forced' sectors of the
military to intervene to restore order and cleanse the body politic of political
13
corruption.
'Politics,'

proletariat,

Fitch elaborates: "In Latin America.. .the conceptual language of national security and
strategy

is

typically infused with an organic, corporatist view of society and politics which

implicitly denigrates democratic politics and civilian politicians."

9

14

The

bureaucratic-authoritarian

phenomenon was soon doomed

A heavy

to failure.

reliance on loosely-monitored technocrats assigned
the mission of "nation-building"

quickly led to the accumulation of massive foreign debt.
This problem,

in addition to the

multiple pressures of daily government, factionalized the
armed forces primarily between

those officers

who wanted

power and those who refused

to leave

Sensing their institution threatened by

its

to "surrender."

political role, strong

elements within the

Brazilian officer corps began the process of extricating the
military from government in the

mid 1970 s. This gradual

return to civilian rule,

known

as abertura or opening, allowed

the Brazilian military to dictate the speed and depth of the transition.
forces,

on the other hand, chose

to

purge their internal

rifts

by

The Argentine armed

fire in the

hopelessly

miscalculated war with England over the Malvinas/Falklands islands. Argentina's
humiliating loss in that endeavor ultimately resulted in a government transition
by collapse.

A new civilian regime,

it

was commonly

felt,

symbolized a fresh beginning for both

Argentina and Brazil. This new genesis appeared an ideal time
civil-military patterns of interaction.

with

its

traditional

poder moderador

(arbiter) military,

twentieth-century bureaucratic-authoritarian mutation, had proven life-threatening

to the very

many

The

to restructure historical

concept of the

state that the

armed forces allegedly had

Thus,

tried to protect.

scholars looked to the United States as the paradigm for democratic civil-military

relations.

The United

States military

embodied

the democratic professionalist model:

obedience to both democracy and civilian authority. However, skepticism remained as
the feasibility of that

model within

Argentina and Brazil were
the

armed forces a

political

still

the

new

power. Moreover, doubts as

power were reinforced within

Latin American civilian regimes. Both

burdened by

distinct social sphere;

the first

their historical corporatist

which

traditionally

baggage of

to the "reality" of the military's departure

few years of post-authoritarian

implied a military framework of "conditional subordination." In

10

allotting

had been accompanied by

life, in

with numerous military demands being met by civilians. Such occurrences,
least,

to

from

both nations,

at the

very

this case, the

armed

forces

would respect

civilian authority until they

deemed

that authority overridden

paiticular interpretation of the national interest;
a shaky foundation
civilian

government

The

their

to re-build

15
.

uncertainties demonstrated by civilian leaders as they
attempted to determine

which type of military they were confronting
in

upon which

by

Rumor de Sabres

,

led Brazilian social scientist Jorge Zaverucha,

to argue that Brazil primarily,

remained tutelary democracies.

Under

actor, a type of guardian over the

relating to the military

and

that

and Argentina

system from

whom civilians

understanding

lesser extent,

required approval in issues

to "national security broadly defined ." 16

in the

much

model, the military remained a powerful

maintained the potential for renewed direct military intervention
conception was steeped

to a

that, "[t]he return

The

in the

tutelary

model

also

form of a coup. This

of civilians to government

is

not automatically equivalent to the 'civilianization of power,' even after free
and fair
elections ."

17

With

the passing of time, other theorists, such as

that the military in a nation such as Brazil has

evolution of electoral politics

patronage determine political

18
.

been

Wendy

Hunter, have suggested

politically neutralized

by the natural

In this theory, the civilian vote and related constituency

reality.

Hunter argues

that the rational-choice

dynamic on

the

part of elected politicians to be re-elected (specifically legislators) strongly discourages

appeasement

to military.

Yet her analysis, more importantly than

its

definition of civil-

military relations, highlights severe weaknesses in Brazilian democratic institutions. That
fragility places into question the future of

truly

democracy and thus

the potential of ever attaining

democratic civil-military relations.
In the Argentine case, while

contemporary mainstream opinion rarely considers the

military a threat, scholars such as Atilio
civil-military equation to

under

examine

civilian leadership.

Boron and

Patrice

McSherry have inverted

the potential for authoritarianism via the

armed

the

forces

McSherry's analysis of Carlos Saul Menem's presidency

demonstrate that the military remains an instrument of internal

11

political

will

power. Moreover,

while the trend

in

other countries of Latin America seems to bode
negatively for the

perpetuation of traditional military prerogatives, Argentina
appears to be following a
reverse path. President Alfonsm's

President

Menem s

initial

accomodation and

military privileges that

were revoked

notion that authoritarianism

alienation

from the military has been replaced by

Menem

praise.

in the early to

has gone so far as to reinstitute

mid 1980 's, placing

in

jeopardy the

merely a memory.

is

This analysis of the civil-military relations of Argentina and Brazil,
like

much

of

Latin Americanist social science, alludes to the difficulty of imposing
any one particular

model as the explanation. Latin America, experiencing extreme cycles
of prosperity,
bankruptcy, authoritarianism, and experiments with democracy, has historically
presented a
highly convoluted picture. This ambiguity, in terms of contemporary
civil-military
relations, has

been exacerbated by the worldwide uncertainty of the post-Cold

Thus, any one model

may be

inappropriate. Instead,

America, particularly for the purposes of
excerpts of

many

this

it

appears that the nations of Latin

study Brazil and Argentina, have adopted

different theories and, in effect, have created their

own

reality.

This comparative study will demonstrate that the military remains a
for

much

To

fulfill that

the

same reason

in

political actor

both nations: Civilian government's need for policy

results.

need, civilian leaders appear content to bargain with the armed forces. This

relationship, comfortable as
civilian

War period.

it

may seem now,

presents a puzzling picture for the future of

government, of the military and of the very concept of democracy.
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CHAPTER 3
BRAZIL: BARGAINING FOR POLITICAL REALITY
In the Brazilian Republic,

no one governs antagonizing the Armed Forces.
Gen. Octavio Costa (1992)
Participant in 1964 coup

After two decades of military rule, 1985 marked what
was hoped to be a

beginning

in Brazilian history.

For

relations in a democratic Brazil

Armed

political scientists, questions as to

would unfold became of central concern.

Forces had interpreted their time

in

government

to as

the

most qualified

to

in

many

would

into a

Two

new

militaries

One

this tradition, the

opposed

to

puzzle for Brazil

was one of determining how

in

in

answer

theory,

3

in

to that

query that represent opposite poles of

accord with Gen. Octavio Costa's opening

Sabres, applies that understanding to the Brazilian case.

He

a strong likelihood of renewed intervention

if

Rumor de

contends that the Brazilian

military, in reality, controls the state through an active tutelary role.

is

1985, and

this military self-conception

quote, argues that the military never truly gave up power. Jorge Zaverucha, in

there

Zaverucha argues

The second

armed

that

military salaries fall to a certain

"intolerable" level or if the nation experiences a socio-politico-economic crisis that

"require" the

that

democracy.

emerged

the civil-military spectrum.

Loveman and Thomas

American context, many

in the best national, as

Cognizant of

civilian-led

theses have

Brazilian

These armed organizations, therefore, considered themselves

respects to this very day,

fit

in the Latin

determine what was

particular/political, interest.

The

Hispanic antipolitics," to the State.' Alain Rouquie traced

sense of moral superiority to the fact that
actually pre-dated the state.

1

civil-military

as an attempt to translate Thomistic

principles of "order, obedience, authority, and stability," what
Brian

Davies have referred

how

new

would

forces, as "guardians" of the state, to once again step into direct rule.

theory, espoused by

electoral politics— self-interest

Wendy

(i.e.

Hunter, concludes that the very essence of

the desire to be re-elected)-in Brazil's clientelistic

14

4

environment has not only neutralized military
the military

from the

political influence, but has

political arena altogether. 5

Both arguments, however, are flawed. Zaverucha's

"tutelary" theory,

based upon the Sarney presidency, considers civil-military
relations so
to discount

any

de facto alienated

real possibility of

Brazil s democratic transition too

much

static that

it

of

it

appears

change. Hunter's argument, on the other hand, affords

much

fluidity, interpreting

events such as the 1988

Constitution as a paradigm of civilian dominance which, as will
be discussed, was far from
the case.

This chapter will attempt to demonstrate, through a close study of

economic events,

that

contemporary Brazilian civil-military relations

theoretical poles established

post-Cold

War

fall

political

between the

by Zaverucha and Hunter. The Brazilian armed

world and globalized economy

that has eliminated

much

and

forces, in a

of the need for

internal and/or external defense, find themselves searching for a "raison d'etre."

Meanwhile those
foothold
civilian

in

international factors have allowed civilian institutions to deepen their

government. Zaverucha's thesis diagrams an active military and a passive

government.

I

argue, however, that those roles have reversed, yet not to the degree

Hunter describes. Rather than

it

dictating policy, the military has found itself forced to

negotiate or "bargain" for concessions in such a
civilian sphere.

manner

that benefits both itself

Events, thus, have shown that the military

is still

and

the

a political variable that

not only needs to be addressed by any Brazilian executive, but can actually be manipulated

by the president for political gain, taking advantage,

ironically, of

many

of the same

inherent national political characteristics that Hunter relies on as proof of her thesis of the
military's

waning

role.

15

3.1

Research Approach

In studying Brazilian civil-military relations one
first needs to address the event that
set the stage for

much

of the debate on the civil-military question

in the 1990's:

the drafting

of the 1988 Constitution. Relying on that document as a
foundation, an analysis will be

made of the

last three Brazilian presidencies; that

Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The rationale
President Jose Sarney (1985-1990), are the

of Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, and

for selecting these three
first

is

that they, unlike

post-authoritarian, directly-elected

presidents (Itamar Franco, rose to the presidency due to the impeachment
of President

Fernando Collor). Thus, they,

in theory,

most pure form, allowing

more precise

3.2

The 1988

for a

would seem

to represent civilian politics in

its

investigation of civil-military relations.

Constitution

In 1988, the Brazilian people attempted to close a chapter of their authoritarian
past

by drafting a new constitution. However, depending on which interpretation one accepts,
that

document

either demonstrated a

continuation of military

Comparative Politics

new

progressive departure from military influence or a

power within government. Wendy Hunter,

article entitled "Politicians

in

her 1995

Against Soldiers: Contesting the Military

in Postauthoritarian Brazil," cites Brazilian labor's guarantee,

under the Constitution of

1988, of an unrestricted right to strike as proof that the Brazilian military's influence had

been neutralized by civilian politicians eager
if

the military

had

still

been a strong

restricting labor unrest, after

The

all,

to

appease potential voters. She explains that

political actor

it

would have been adamant about

she concludes:

socially disruptive effects of strikes— street protests, the destruction of

property, the failure to deliver goods and services-are antithetical to the core
military principles of order and discipline.

16

6

Hunter

s

analysis of the reasons

correct, yet

was

what she

fails to

why

labor control

acknowledge

is

is

desired by the military

that in that very

same

is

absolutely

constitution the military

able to (through the use of permanent lobbyists)
have their internal policing function

written into the

new "law

of the land."

The armed

forces, in effect, guaranteed the

perpetuation of an internal moderating role for themselves,
similar to the one they had

enjoyed since the

late

1964 coup.

constitutional delegates were, therefore, able to satisfy their
constituents

The

while the military

still

1

800 s which had offered them

had a rather ambiguous

right to break a strike if

as posing a threat to internal order or security.

compromise"

politics that

would most come

the legitimate opening to justify their

It

would be

it

could be construed

that type of "concession or

to define Brazilian civil-military relations in the

1990's.

3.3

The Presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-1992)

With
to the polls

the first direct elections in nearly 30 years, the Brazilian people in 1989 rallied

and chose the

vibrant, attractive,

young candidate Fernando Collor de Mello.

Collor appeared to promise true change and a greater attempt
military past. This latter sentiment

cabinet

when

was seemingly evident

escaping the nation's

at the

presentation of his

new

his military ministers all appeared in civilian clothing; a clear departure

their obsessive affinity for barracks attire

society.

at

However,

the question

still

which distinguished them from "common"

remained as

domination could be backed with actions

in

to

whether

this

show of apparent

times of civil-military discord.

What

troubled presidency eventually proved was that the armed forces were not, in

completely subordinated

to executive

professionalist model, yet they

from

command

according to a

were also not the active

strictly

civilian

Collor's

fact,

democratic

tutors of national political

power

Zaverucha had described. Instead the military under Collor began a process of adapting

17

itself to a

new

role

which accepted

the

need for

political negotiation,

however

reluctantly,

with the civilian executive for the attainment of mutual
gain.

3.3.1 Disbanding of the Servigo National de
Informagao (SNI) (National
Information/Intelligence Service)

In his first year as president, Collor, in a very publicized

the

armed forces

directly

move, tackled the

issue of

by disbanding the military-run intelligence agency, the Servigo

Nacional de Informagao (SNI). The SNI was replaced by the newly-created
Secretariat of
Strategic Affairs (SAE),

whose

was

director

to

be a

apparently gave credence to the thesis that the military,

whims of electoral
military

power

between both

is

politics.

9

However, a

true

Such a

civilian.

in effect,

radical decision

had become victim

to the

measure of post-authoritarian Brazilian

civil-

only possible by an analysis of the underlying agreements and "deals"

sides.

In disbanding the SNI, Collor fulfilled the expectations of

him, since the power of successful electoral politics

recognize popular desires for change,

at least in

is

many who had

voted for

about "supporting policies that

some highly

visible areas."

presence within the Executive was definitely a "highly visible area," thus

10

The SNI

how

better to gain

popularity than by defying the military and apparently succeeding.

Even
stride

a public protest by the former military chief of

by the energetic

president.

When

criticized those

who

jibe apparently

aimed

referred to the

at the president.

be taken

in

command

of

of 1990, he delivered a scathing speech

the role of that organization.

He

harshly

as "barbaric" or "abominable"; a less than subtle

The

reserved for a speech delivered five days

surrounded by senior

May

SNI and

SNI

to

Gen. Luis de Araujo Braga assumed

the southeastern regional military district in

praising his days as past chief of the

SNI appeared

public awaited Collor's response which he

later.

Before 1200 Infantry soldiers and

officers, the civilian president stated:

You gentlemen represent the loyal and disciplined obedience to the man that,
besides being the head of State and Government, by the free and direct choice of the

18

Brazilian people,

Armed

our

It

truly

that

is

by Constitutional disposition, the supreme commander
of

also,

Forces.

appeared that civilian power was making a surge. However,

such bravado was merely for valuable opinion ratings. The

involved a

3. 3. 1.1

much more

intricate negotiation not easily captured

the art of negotiation.

considers

of the situation

reality

by television sound

bites.

to

other Latin American leaders, have to be experts in

contend with incredible

clientelistic relationships,

many

itself, in

many

They have

on a tightrope, multiple

weak

regards, greater than the state.

deficits,

an

economy balanced

party bases, and a military that
12

As Jorge Zaverucha has

still

implied,

implausible that the Brazilian military in 1990, enjoying a considerable degree of

internal cohesion,

and

or moderating power,
its

soon became evident

SNI Concessions

Brazilian presidents, like

it is

it

internal security

who

for generations held a philosophy of being the

would merely accept

community.

13

The

on

Collor was aware of

by much shifting of personnel and resources

met with a high degree of

attacks

its

poder moderador

most prized possessions such

this,

thus his

as

move was tempered

that guaranteed that his decision

would not be

military criticism.

president's disbanding of the

SNI was cushioned by

offices that had, in part, already been occurring for years.

a clever manipulation of

Throughout the Sarney

presidency (1985-1990), the Minister of the Military Staff Corps, Waldir Eduardo Martins,
in

an attempt to avoid both the threatening autonomy of the SNI

military experience in intelligence, in case of
that agency.

The

result

was

that,

civilian-led S

AE

dissolution,

and

to guarantee greater

had linked many generals

with the disbanding of the SNI,

officers (because of their experience

newly formed

SNI

14

many

to

of those military

and knowledge) maintained high positions within the

while others simply returned to the barracks or offered their

expertise to the Army's intelligence agency (CEE).

19

The

rest

were channeled

into the

Reserves.

As

for the active civilian agents in the SNI, they

were guaranteed employment

within the national government due to a loophole in
the civil service law. The only real
"losers"

were the administrative support

staff

who were

Collor was also afforded added security

in

dismissed.

making

his

15

seemingly "rash" decision,

because the military had long found the SNI a "double-edged sword." 16
The agency kept a
vigilant eye

on potential subversion but the scope of their jurisdiction also reached
the

armed forces themselves. Nearly every

SNI

which tended

investigation

to

military promotion

judge a candidate by

was delayed by

the need for an

political rather than merit criteria;

thus defying the military's deeply-believed sense of being the only
honorable (merit-based)

means of social mobility

3. 3. 1.2

in

a country mired by clientelism. 17

Electoral Politics: Both Sides

As

Win

for electoral politics, the disbanding of the

SNI guaranteed Collor broad

public

support, greater freedom to operate (one less military official in his cabinet) and a
potentially less-biased flow of information into the presidential palace, since the
its

had been

military chief)

military maintained

avenue of access

its

directly responsible for all executive intelligence. 18

presence to some extent

to the president. But,

Collor's decision bolstered the

in the security

more importantly,

its

community,

it

SNI

While

(with
the

did lose one

relative peaceful acceptance of

image of civilian-led democracy, and gave the general

population one less reason to fear the armed forces. As one political scientist

acknowledged:

[South American militaries] seek to avoid further politicization, factionalism, and
Many such armed
forces also feel compelled to enhance their professional standing and repair their
public image. Reacting in too heavy-handed a manner to civilian efforts to
subordinate them would risk incurring negative public opinion and possibly civilian
corruption, institutional strains resulting from military rule.

sanctions.

19

20

The

military s acquiescence, therefore, could be interpreted
as a smart political/public

relations tactic.

Finally, in an

announcement whose timing seems

CoHor, the new civilian-led

SAE

in

1990 recommended

to reflect a further concession

by

that the role of the military with

regard to the nation's nuclear energy activities be expanded. The

SAE proposed the

construction of six nuclear reactors: 3 under the aegis of the Navy;
2 under the Air Force;

and

under the Army. 20

1

3.3.2

The

Military Re-defines Itself as an Interest /Pressure

The concessions behind

the disbanding of the

Group

SNI seemed emblematic

of a

new

era

of civil-military relations in Brazil. Lacking a defined mission, and plagued by a tradition
of small budgets (dating back even to
military has

Nunn have
a

new

abandoned much of

alluded to

in their

when

it

was

in

power)

(table 3.1), the Brazilian

the "guardian" rhetoric that researchers such as Frederick

works.

21

Instead the military appears to have adapted

role as an interest group, "seeking to influence the debate

working,

in particular, to solicit

on defense appropriations,

funds for both salaries and high-tech projects." 22 Contrary

to Zaverucha's thesis, the military's strength as a pressure group,

from the

seems not

to

emanate

threat of a unified attempt at another military government. In the twenty years the

military ruled the nation,
the

itself to

economy

24

suffered from internal factionalism

it

or increase

its

shrank dramatically during

own armed

that period,

constant or increased (tables 3.1

a fear, shared by the senior

23

and was unable

to stabilize

forces budget. Military appropriations actually

even though the size of the military either remained

& 3.2).

command and

Instead, the military's influence appears based on
the government, of "wildcat"

coup attempts

(mutinies) led by disgruntled officers which threaten both the institution of the military and
the government's economic/political balance.

21

The importance of military cohesion
was highlighted

European Union. Negotiation on

upon the success of Cardoso's
held the potential to

Latin

state.

armed forces and

the

government

recently as current president Fernando Henrique
Cardoso attempted to

establish trade ties with the

many European

for both the

damage

officials,

neo-liberal

the nation's

economic

still

plan.

that issue

Any

was contingent

disruptions in the barracks

shaky reputation on the international scene, as

such as Helmut Kohl, remained skeptical as to the

stability

of that

Lacking the Cold War's pretense of legitimacy, contemporary
military

rumblings, regardless of their effective threat to civilian power, exacerbate
domestic and
international apprehension along the entire social spectrum. This
aversion

ways, a product of the post-Cold

War

military senior

in

many

globalization that has linked the world's business

communities and economies more intimately than ever

The

is,

command, meanwhile,

25
.

fears division of

dissatisfied factions. This occurrence could not only disrupt the

its

armed

forces into

economy, but

in the

process threaten military hierarchy/order and tarnish the relatively "clean" reputation the

armed forces enjoy
frustrate so

much

as a

body

that

seemingly represents an absence of the vices

of Brazilian society

26
.

22

that

1

Table

3.

Military Expenditures as Percentage of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay,

1972-1983
Year
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

GNP in Four Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes
6

Argentina

Brazil

Chile

Uruguay

1.4

1.4

2.3

2.4

1.7

1.4

3.7

2.4

1.9

1.2

4.9

2.9

0.8

1.1

4.8

2.7

3.2

1.2

4.1

2.2

3.2

1.0

4.0

2.4

3.0

0.8

4.2

2.3

3.2

0.7

3.6

2.4

3.6

0.7

3.6

2.9

3.9

0.7

3.7

4.0

3.5

0.9

4.3

4.1

2.7

0.7

4.5

3.3

Source: U.S. Government,

Arms

Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers, 1972-1982 (April 1984), pp. 17-49; and World Military’ Expenditures and Arms
Transfer
1985 (August 1985), pp. 52-88.

Table 3.2

Armed-Force Size
and Uruguay
thousands)
Year
1972

in

Four Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina, Brazil Chile

(in

1973
1974
1975

Argentina

Brazil

Chile

140
160
150
160

410
420
435
455
450
450
450
450
450
450
460
460

75
75

1976
1977
1978
1979
1980

155

1981

155

1982
1983

175

155
155
155
155

175

Source: U.S. Government,

Arms

Arms

90

Uruguay
20
20

110

25
25

111

28

111

28
28

111
111

116
116
116
126

28
28
28
29
30

Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and

Transfers, 1972-1982, and 1985, pp. 17-49, and pp. 52-88.
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3.3.2.

1

Pragmatic

General Newton Cerqueira

Politics:

General Newton Cerqueira,
hard-liner,

recognized the

military relations and used

Club of Rio

1990.

in

The

new

it

who

interest

during the military regime had been identified
as a

group mentality emerging

in Brazilian civil-

as his platform in running for the presidency
of the Military

news weekly

Brazilian

Istoe described Cerqueira as "dedicating

special attention to less noble problems such as salaries,
pensions, and medical

coverage...."-

7

His opponent, General Diogo Figueiredo, attacked Cerqueira for
what

seemed, according

armed

to Figueiredo, to

forces. Figueiredo, opted to

be his opponent's attempted "unionization" of the

campaign on

traditional military

themes of national

security and military prestige as an entity separate and superior to society. 28

the election

seems

to

be quite

telling of the military's

new outlook

The

result of

in the 1990's,

with

Cerqueira, the apparent "radical," winning.

Cerqueira drew national attention to himself not so

much because

his ideas

novel, rather because they stated publicly what to a certain extent had been, and
transpiring in Brazilian civil-military relations.

abandoned much of

their traditional

reap practical returns.

29

forces' dismal record in

The

the

driven politics they would be low on the

list

summed up

31

civilian sphere, in order to

acutely aware that, in light of the

new "world

to isolate themselves.

Vidigal, in a recent public letter

is

today,

forces have, in effect,

condescendence toward the

military leadership

power and

overthrow government or

The armed

is

were

order,"

30

armed

they can not afford to either

As Wendy Hunter

of budgetary priorities.

32

notes, in electorally-

Admiral Armando

this Brazilian military reality stating:

...[T]he only escape from the moral crisis is that which is determined by democratic
means. There is no other .... The military will contribute to that process by
remaining loyal to the principles of the constitution, along with the whims of

society. In that scenario, the fury of the legions will only express itself through the
vote.

In a politically mature society, this

the legions, (emphasis mine)

33

24

is

the only alternative that

is

available to

The
politics.

Brazilian

armed forces thus acknowledge

that they too

must play

Moreover, because of the very divided nature of Brazilian

electoral

politics (parties in

Biazil are infamous for their lack of loyal adherents) 34
the military has the potential to serve
as a powerful political ally as

3.3.3

The

Military Budget

The budget

is

foreign debt in Latin

would be evidenced during

Under Collor

a polemical issue in any nation, however in Brazil, with the
largest

America and a

monumental importance. Under
to

the presidency of Itamar Franco.

pattern of skyrocketing inflation,

it

assumes

the 1988 Constitution, the budget for military salaries

was

be gauged to that of the legislative and judicial branches. However, table 3.3
indicates

that

was

rarely the case, as

low

salaries in the face of rising

consumer prices made

for very

tight times within the barracks.

Table 3.3

Monthly Salary Comparison
(in

Cruzeiros-- 1992)

Military

Executive

Legislative

Judicial

General

Minister

Minister

892

1,039

Deputy/Senator
1,152

Colonel
651

Executive Sec.

Director

Director-Gen.

515

1,167

948

Captain

Dept. Director

N/A

401

421

Leg. Assessor
1,167

Lieutenant

High-level Tech.

High-level Tech.

High-level Tech.

311

485

868

500

Sergeant

Secretary

Secretary

Secretary

238

117

911

555

Corporal
133

Driver

Driver

Driver

86

385

263

1,319

Source: Istoe, 10 July 91: pp. 18-19.

Patrice

Franko explains

this

unequal phenomenon,

slow (or anemic) economic growth or have

must

resort to cuts in military spending."

35

in part,

by writing, "As countries face

to transfer funds to service external debt, they

Franko does, however, acknowledge

25

that in

nations such as Brazil, with strong institutionalized
militaries, "the rate

spending declines often takes place

budget areas." 36 The

3.3.3.

1

latter

was,

at a

much slower

in fact, the

at

which defense

rate than the cuts applied to other

case during the

Samey

presidency.

Mutual Sacrifice?

Nevertheless, by 1991 the military budget, traditionally small in Brazil
(less than

2%

GDP), 37 had

of

of the
year.

Armed

39

0.5% of

shriveled to

Forces

in

GDP. 38

the

A report released by the

1992 calculated military losses

in real salary alone

of

Staff

850%

Corps
that

In the midst of such financial devastation, the military, according
to Franko,

remained relatively passive primarily because the nation as a whole was suffering through
a
period of tremendous economic stress and in a post-Cold

War environment,

greater salaries to fight subversion

support her argument she cites

seemed

out-dated.

To

the excuse of

the following statement issued by Collor’s Minister of Aeronautics, Lt. Brigadier Socrates

Monteiro

in

March of

1991:

While our Armed Forces

clearly

be possible when the economy

need

is

to

modernize

stabilized.

their

That realism was also noted by Admiral Mario Cesar Flores
Poli'tica Militar,

Even with

when he

equipment,

this will

only

book, Bases Para

Uma

40

in his

wrote:

a growing

economy. ..the priority of the Brazilian social and
impede real increases in the military budget in the near

infrastructural debt will

future.

The problem

41

for Flores, as well as Monteiro,

was

their frustration with the fact that the

Brazilian military budget had traditionally been one of the smallest per capita in Latin

America, yet kept decreasing. This understanding was aggravated by the notion

Wendy Hunter cites, what

little

that, as

revenue the national government did have was divvied up

26

primarily for civilian "spoils," a natural

phenomenon of Brazilian

electoral politics; she

notes:

The rampant

pursuit of patronage resources by politicians not only
clashes with the
long-standing positivist impulse within the military to 'rationalize'
the public
bureaucracy. It also leads them into direct competition with
military elites over state
resources. Politicians are tempted to shift budget shares away
from the military to
civilian ministries better suited for pork barrel. Similarly,
where military officers
hold key posts in large state enterprises-strategic positions from
which to build a
network of political allies by distributing jobs and other benefits-patronage-seeking
politicians will try to replace them.

The competition for resources is thus another
the incentives unleashed by democratic competition militate
against
the continued entrenchment of the military in the political and
economic fabric of the

way m which

country

2

Based upon both Franko's and Hunter’s analyses,

the military, appears to have very

choice or power to alter the "new" political-economic

reality.

events in 1991 and 1992 would prove that the armed forces

little

Despite these arguments,

still

possessed a considerable

degree of political influence.

3. 3. 3. 2

Mutual Sacrifice + Tradition =

Three months

demanded

Leverage

Monteiro made his

initial

conciliatory statement, he

"salaries compatible with [the military's] functions as soon as possible." 43

can one explain
appears to

after Minister

Political

lie

this

apparent contradiction, which Franko overlooks?

possible answer

with the military's attempt to manipulate Brazilian popular opinion; a practice

which, as Hunter cited,

is

an inherent feature of electoral interest-oriented

though she only considered
the Brazilian

One

How

it

it still

a ploy

is

very

much

enjoys nationally (relative to other militaries with

bureaucratic-authoritarian pasts,
In a nation

even

as applying to civilians at the expense of the military. That

armed forces could even consider attempting such

testament to the respect

politics,

infamous for

i.e.

that of Argentina).

44

civilian political corruption; incredible

(which Francisco Weffort describes as "social apartheid")

45
;

economic

disparity

and a history of military

intervention, the well-publicized concept of "mutual sacrifice" between the traditionally

27

powerful armed forces and the
lelations

"common

people" had the potential to become a public

weapon. In an electorally-driven system,

this translated into a negotiating

advantage. Both of Lt. Brigadier Monteiro's remarks reflect
that understanding.
as

all

Franko noted, he conceded
Brazilians, evoking an

move,

image of military

argue, garnered the

I

armed forces would accept

that the

later, to

increases, while remaining

military as "the purest

image

that the

enhanced

(i.e.

armed
"we"

solidarity with the Brazilian citizenry.

SNI disbandment). This allowed Monteiro

play the

ambiguous

was ignored. Monteiro here

request

financial sacrifice just like

That

armed forces a generous degree of popular respect (which

already had been cultivating since the
opportunity, three months

Initially,

more

as to

traditional military card:

it

the

demanding

salary

what action the armed forces would take

if

the

thus relied on the classical definition of the Brazilian

image of society" 46

(i.e.

less corrupt than civilian politicians); an

forces' recent willingness to accept "belt-tightening"

sacrificed, but did "they"?). Apparently,

had only

Monteiro was hoping

that the

sympathetic civilian population would feel "justifiably" threatened or motivated (depending

on the interpretation) by the unknown repercussions of

his

demand

to pressure their

own

intransigent elected representatives to accede.

The

results of the military's apparent strategy

national survey conducted by

Data Tres which noted

apportioning the military a salary increase;

47

were borne out

in a July

that the majority of Brazilians favored

leaving unclear whether the outcome of the

survey was a reflection of a popular fear of a military so downtrodden that
forced to coup or instead was a product of sympathy for the
organization.

48
I

argue that

concluded, "the army

3. 3. 3. 3

is

it

Collor Responds to

it

is

not an idiot."

could be

Jair

Balsonaro

49

Demands (Almost)

Both Collor and Monteiro were most
military

it

members of a once proud

was a combination of both. As Captain

patriotic but

1991

likely

aware

that the probability of another

government or even a broadly supported coup were

28

unlikely, but the military did

have the potential

to disrupt the president's already dire
politico/economic program. In an

environment where mere hints of national problems can send
stocks and the currency on a

downward
Collor's

spin,

it

was imperative

for Collor to

armed forces ministers had

somehow

contend with rumors of sporadic revolts 50 from an

to

increasingly disgruntled junior officer corps which

own

Emblematic of the mutually
relations, Collor

offer

answered the

him a weapon

his presidency, Collor's

antagonism over

by both the pdtria and

its

beneficial role of contemporary Brazilian civil-military

military's

demands

in his losing battle

economic and

rift

in a

way he appears

with the legislature.

political

inflation, privatization,

become an insurmountable
politically,

slighted

felt

command. 51

senior

would

placate the military leadership.

agendas were

in

to

have hoped

One year and

a half into

chaos. Interbranch

and the presidential ego opened what was soon

to

between the executive and the congress. 52 Isolated

Collor apparently viewed the military and

its

demands

as an "ace" in the

game

of

political poker.

Relying on presidential privilege, Collor

measure"

finally instituting an

would seem

that Collor

armed

had caved

June of 1991 issued a "temporary

in late

within thirty days. Since military funding

was defeated

(to

much

less

when

resounding applause

it

is

is

the casual observer

if

the congress fails to act

normally a low legislative priority

imposed by an unpopular president,

in the legislative

it

However, under Brazilian law,

in to military pressure.

an executive "temporary measure" only becomes effective

according to Hunter,

To

forces salary increase.

chamber).

53

upon

it

in Brazil,

the

measure

The outcome was

so

transparent that one must question the motives behind such an ill-fated presidential
decision.

The

president's strategy

was

to

appear sympathetic to the military's plight,

all

the

while recognizing that the congress would never approve his measure. That branch's
refusal, Collor

affording

hoped, would channel the armed forces'

him a valuable

ire

onto the congress, while

military alliance that could be tapped as leverage in later executive-

29

legislative negotiations, alluding to an auto-golpe
scenario. Unfortunately for Collor, his

gamble did not succeed, as many senior

officers interpreted the temporary measure's
defeat

as further evidence of the president's weakness. 54

Nevertheless, a "secret executive budget" was discovered
two months

appeared

to

be an attempt by Collor

neutral. This "budget"

to

keep the military,

if

not on his side, then at least

circumvented congress and allocated over $5

the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs

the three branches of the

(SAE)

armed forces

which many military

(in

later, that

billion Cruzeiros to

officers

worked) and

to

(table 3.4).

Table 3.4
Fernando Collor de Mello's "Secret Budget"

SAE

$5,200,000,000 (Cruzeiros)
$290,000,000
$59,000,000
$9,000,000

Air Force

Navy
Army
Source: Istoe, "P 090 sem fundo," 14 August 91
:

3.3.4

9.

1

Impeachment (1992)

According

main impetus
institution.

is

p.

~

assumed

forces

55

to

many

of the generals responsible for the intervention of 1964, the

for their actions
If politics

reimpose order."

the Brazilian military

government and

social

American

to their

56

military circles that the "patriotic duty of the

Jorge Zaverucha noted that one of the scenarios

would abandon, what he

resort,

chaos and a direct threat

degenerate and "endanger the national honor and integrity," then

in traditional Latin

[is to]

was a sense of

felt,

was

its

57

crisis."

armed

which

active tutelary role over

once again, to direct intervention was

"worsening of a socio-politico-economic

in

it

if

Brazil experienced a

Based upon these

criteria, the

events of

1992 would seem to indicate that a coup was imminent. Fernando Collor, who had never
been extremely popular with the armed forces, was embroiled
the nation's executive branch; inflation

was climbing

30

in a

scandal that threatened

rapidly; Brazil's real

growth

rate for

was a dismal -0.9%; 58 and

that year

the nation's

two major stock markets were

plummeting, as was the already low value of the national currency,
the Cruzeiro. 59
Furthermore, the armed forces, as an
crisis in

over

thirty years.

The answer

60

institution,

was experiencing

Yet, the military did not intervene;

to that query,

I

its

worst economic

why?

contend, rests with a combination of explanations
some

of which have already been alluded

to.

First, in late

May

of 1992, Collor sent his Minister

of Economics, Marcflio Marques Moreira, on a "damage control"
mission to shore up key
political

and economic support

that

seemed poised

to disappear in light of the unfolding

executive scandal. Moreira not only contacted the nation's major industrial
and business
figures, but also those of the international

community. Most importantly,

of this study, he personally went to the main barracks and met with

armed forces assuring them

The second

assume

who had

the executive.

a reputation of being

Such a

relationship

to

when he

forces' acquiescence is that with

more amenable

strategy of restraint

could prove useful

Army, Gen. Carlos Tinoco,

members, appeared

armed

secure, the military could simply wait for Collor's vice-president,

to the public which, in turn,

minister of the

the

in

armed

the military's appearance

subsequent bargaining. Even Collor's

most conservative of
this

new

all

the military cabinet

civil-military

ever, will maintain itself within the strict confines of the

And it takes great pleasure

in

stand has garnered from all the sectors of national
62
community itself (emphasis mine)

hearing the praises that

life

and from

not been such a certainty, the military might
First, as

still

impeachment

have refrained from intervention for the

1964 proved, a temporary intervention

31

its

this

the international

also be argued, contrary to Zaverucha's prediction, that had

following reasons.

forces, to

stated:

constitutional duties.

may

to the

would enhance

have understood the advantages of

The Army, more than

It

the ministers of the

budget would be revamped that same year. 61

possible explanation for the

impeachment apparently
Itamar Franco,

that their

all

for the purposes

may

not be enough to

satiate military officers

competent enough

to

who may

whom power could be

weighed on the minds of
still

feel that there is

the senior

no

civilian or

group of civilians

handed over. 63 This

command

possibility

must have

as elements within the Brazilian officer
corps

recalled the institutionally-threatening factionalism
created by their twenty years in

power.

64

As Guillermo O'Donnell

noted:

Although there

is a high probability of internal cohesion
when the military is
dedicated to a strictly professional conception of its functions,
this probability is
bound to diminish as the military assumes and exercises governmental
65
power.

Second, with an economy that was cited as one of
the

armed

the, if not the,

forces, cognizant of their prior catastrophic

worst

economic record

in

in

Latin America,

government

(in

1982, they were actually forced to admit publicly "that the country was on the
verge of

insolvency

),

may have concluded

that a

coup

in

over a "sinking ship" and should they not be able

1992 would have been akin

to

to taking

produce economic success on

their

"watch," they would only risk further tarnishing their reputation. 67 Finally, contrary to the

auto-golpe strategy of President Fujimori

in Peru, military rule in today's

post-Cold

War

world, has a greater probability to suffer from a lack of legitimacy. Unlike an authoritarian
civilian regime, a military

government would

"military dictatorship" with

lack of civil liberties,

68

etc..

dictatorship as well, but the

of those negative images.

3.4

all

the

some

point be perceived as solely a

accompanying connotations of human

Ironically, those

mere

at

fact that

it is

same

"evils"

a civilian

may

rights violations,

be part of a civilian

government somehow

filters

many

most

likely

be

69

The Presidency of Itamar Franco (1992-1994)

The Itamar Franco period
remembered

for the president's

in Brazilian history will, unfortunately,

numerous

social blunders.

70

Yet, less

memorable but more

important was Franco's civil-military negotiating that manipulated both the Brazilian armed

32

forces history and their

new

interest/pressure group orientation, 71 eventually
reaping

rewards for the nation's next president, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso.

political

Assuming

the presidency in October of 1992, Franco had
the

of trying to salvage an

worsened)

until

economy

shambles.

in

72

He had no

monumental challenge

success (the

economy

actually

he transferred renowned sociologist, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso from his

post as Minister of Foreign Affairs to that of Minister of Economics. 73

Cardoso

s

ultimate success in the economics office was based upon a
program of

currency conversion, massive spending cuts, increased privatization,
and greater world

market inclusion;

all

features that

seemed anathema

establishment. This apprehension
exiled in 1964 and had

opposition.

3.4.1

The

In

upon

his return

of the Brazilian military

the fact that

been "the" representative of the

Cardoso had been
intellectual

74

Military as an Interest to be Courted

1993 Cardoso proposed a series of major reductions

soon found himself forced

would not escape

to

the

it

received the least amount of

would be

left

in

government

untouched. However, Cardoso

renege on his promise and by year's end indicated that the

economic ax with what would,

cut in their budget of $21 billion Cruzeiros.

beyond

much

was only aggravated by

expenditures, yet assured the military that

military

to

money

The

per capita of

Brazilian

all

in

essence,

armed

forces,

amount

to a

which already

the major nations in Latin

America and

(table 3.5), reacted fervently.

Table 3.5
Military Expenditures Per Capita
(in

US$)

USA

Gr. Britain

Chile

Argentina

Mexico

Brazil

902

395

55

35

10

7

Source: The Military Balance— IISS 1992/1993

33

40%

In

what was perhaps

power

government since turning over

1985, the head of the Military Staff Corps severely chastised
Cardoso for his

in

austerity

their strongest criticism of civilian

program. President Franco, realizing

that military support in a tortuous
political

environment such as Brazil's could prove valuable, intervened

showdown between
forces

to prevent a

major

the military and his government. Franco guaranteed
that the

would be spared

the budget cuts and that they

would be able

armed

to secure their pet

projects such as the nuclear submarine and space programs. 75

3.4. 1.1

The PT and

the Military?

The importance of military support became
election year

when

clear early in the 1994 presidential

the military's traditional arch-rival, the socialist Workers' Party (PT),

published a study that was highly sympathetic to the armed forces. The study

demonstrated that the military did not have the capacity,

in its

then state of financial

malaise, to defend the nation should an emergency arise. Furthermore, the

abandoning
concisely

its

who

summed-up by a

victory,

in

also

traditional aversion to national conscription. This abrupt about-face

the coming-together of the

PT,

PT

general in the Staff Corps: "There

PT and

the military.

It's

interest

because

it

appeared

to

was

no mutual good-feeling

pure pragmatism."

January of 1994 appeared to be the party closest

piqued the military's

is

began

76

in

Nevertheless, the

to the next presidential

be the only organized and

effective political entity that recognized the need for an increase in the military's budget for

the national good.

3.4. 1.2

Building an Executive-Military Alliance, Part

With

now became

the

new

I

leverage garnered from the PT's declaration of support, the military

a pivotal chess piece in the

game of electoral

34

politics.

With

presidential

elections scheduled for October of 1994, rumors of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso running

against the PT's
early

months of

immensely popular Luis "Lula" Inacio da Silva began
the year. In February of that year, in a decision

suspiciously indicate an attempt to regain military backing that

PT,

77

Franco had his Minister of the

Army announce

that year receive the first of four annual

equipment.
not

make

78

What

is

tightening,

among

the

men

in

so,

arms. Apparently,

in a

anyone or any organization $800 million U.S.

3.4. 1.3

publicly that the

was

would have

armed forces would

that

to

further increased his

be seen on national television giving

II

was only

the first step of political

"deal-making" between the executive and the armed forces. One week
military budget announcement. Franco disclosed that he
a

Franco himself did

dollars.

for military expenses

Rubens Bayma Denys, who had been

new

time of tremendous national "belt-

Building an Executive-Military Alliance, Part

The loosening of funds

is

to

slipped to the

million payments to purchase

which had he done

the last thing the President desired

whose timing seems

may have

particularly striking about this declaration

the announcement,

popularity

US$200

to circulate in the

member

was

momentous

shuffling his cabinet. General

of Sarney's inner circle, was appointed

Minister of Transportation. That selection brought the grand
representatives in the presidential palace to seven (table 3.6).

35

after the

total

of military

Table 3.6
Chief of the Military Staff Corps
Minister of the

Adm. Amaldo

Army

Leite Pereira

Minister of the Navy
Minister of the Air Force

Gen. Zenildo de Lucena
Adm. Ivan Serpa
Gen. Lelio Lobo

Minister of the SAE ##
Chief of the Secretariat for Federal
Administration **

Adm. Mario Cesar Flores
Gen. Romildo Canhim

Minister of Transportation **

Gen. Rubens

Bayma Denys

^Brazil's intelligence agency which was originally formed under
Collor for the purpose of replacing the
^
6
military-run SNI.

**Not

traditionally military appointments

This apparent "militarization" of government was rather alarming to
civilian sector, but the logic of

3.4.2

it

many

within the

soon became evident.

The "Real" Plan

Fernando Henrique Cardoso's

political aspirations, as well as the

hopes of the

Brazilian nation, were soon revealed to be hinged upon a currency conversion and

indexation plan
that

was

would

to

first

known

as the "Unit of Real Value"

be implemented

need

to

in 1994.

be approved

However,

in the

(Unidade de Valor Real) or Real Plan,

for that plan to

have any hope of success

congress and bypass any legal challenge

judiciary. Unfortunately for Cardoso, the Real plan's conversion factor

10.94%

real salary loss for the

the plan

was delayed

members of the

legislative

as an interbranch battle ensued.

It

in the

would

and judicial branches.

was

it

result in a
79

Thus,

at this point that the deals

between the military and the executive reaped rewards.

By

increasing the

fortified the executive

earn as

much

number of military

officers in his presidential cabinet, Franco

branch with representatives of an organization

as the judiciary or the legislature

had rarely been the case

in the

that

was supposed

by law. However, as table 3.3 noted,

previous four years. The military, thus, had

36

little

had
to

that

to lose

under the new economic plan. Therefore, when the

legislative

implementation of the Real plan due to issues of their

own

and judicial branches

salary, they

stalled

were confronting

an ambiguous executive-military alliance which did not
seem to bode well for their

continued existence. This anxiety was only exacerbated by
such comments as that made by
the Minister of the Military Staff Corps: "If

it's

a confrontation between the branches that

they [Legislature and Judiciary] want, then the military
obstacle

was overcome and

after

is

ready."

80

Ultimately, the judicial

continued negotiation the Real Plan was implemented

in

July of 1994.

3.4.3

The Changing Definitions of Poder Moderador

The

political

"war games" conducted by Itamar Franco altered the course of the

1994 presidential campaign, allowing Cardoso's Real Plan the leeway necessary
effective.

The plan

drastically

reduced inflation and created relative economic

given Brazil's recent economic history. This,

Economics Minister

in the

in turn,

October presidential

to

have learned

to take

politics.

election.

Much

What

They have,

in

armed forces appeared

advantage of their position as the armed segment of a post Cold

in effect, re-defined the

political allies or

meaning of poder moderador.

81

political

Instead they can moderate

and economic

strategies.

power because of the

No

longer do they
evil

and

disruptions they can cause to

As General Newton Cerqueira

realized during his

aforementioned campaign for presidency of the Military Club of Rio, the contemporary
Brazilian military's existence

system that many officers

is

dependent on involvement within the civilian

in the past

had so despised.

37
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War

uncomfortable

"moderate" politics as a type of mythical guardian solely capable of discerning
purity.

stability,

Franco's negotiations

to the contrary, the

democratic society by imposing themselves as valuable
foes.

be

reaped electoral rewards for the

demonstrated was that the military had not necessarily become a non-factor

contemporary Brazilian electoral

to

political

3.4.3.

1

"Delegative Democracy" and the Zaverucha and Hunter
Theories

Franco's intervention and his later negotiations with
the military would be one more

example

in a series

of events that further gave credence to the thesis that
the military

remains an influence
If the military

was

in Brazilian politics, yet not to the

still

the all-powerful dictator of

government

social scientist argues, particularly policy vis-a-vis the

why

a unified military

decade

would allow

its

armed

traditionally small

policy, as that Brazilian

forces, then

one must ask

budget to be cut over the

such extreme levels, forcing even basic military practices and
services

to

discontinued?

83

political sphere,

static

to

last half

be

Moreover, why would senior elements within the armed forces, such

General Cerqueira, recognize a need

Thus, the

degree Jorge Zaverucha believed.

if,

as

to re-define the military's

Zaverucha claimed,

it

as

mission with relation to the

already enjoyed a privileged insider position?

conception of military tutelage appears invalid.

Nevertheless, in order to accept Hunter's diametrically-opposed theory, that the
military

is

no longer a

political actor,

one would need

to defy both facts

and

logic.

Hunter

argues that Brazilian politics (primarily with reference to the legislature) are prone to
rational choice individualism with

and much

Much

less,

any

little

or no conception of party line and/or party loyalty

interest in "wasting" valuable patronage funds

of her evidence

is

valid.

Indeed party

politics in Brazil are notoriously fickle

clientelism and patronage are inherent features.

weak

institutions, political self-preservation

on the armed forces.

may

As

Joel

Migdal has noted,

in states

and
with

be too overriding a temptation:

...an inadequate power base for the state makes it a tempting prize for those who do
have some organizational backing, either in society at large or even within one of
the state's many tentacles. But the prize is often chimerical, for what aspiring
leaders seize is not the capability to transform their societies in accordance with their
goals, but simply seats coveted by others. Just to preserve their seats, they must
adopt means that foreclose the use of power to fulfill their original purposes.
84
Instead, substantive policy issues are pushed to the back burner.
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Yet, in this context,
is

the nation?

how

is

the Brazilian president expected to succeed,
for his constituency

As Robert Dahl

noted, "a key characteristic of a democracy

is

the continuing

responsiveness of the government [read: the President] to the
preferences of
citizens ...."

its

85

Because of

that very

dilemma, and

in light

of the military's adaptation to a more

interest-group format (abandoning abstract themes in order
to gain practical concessions),
will

be very

armed

difficult for a Brazilian president to resist the temptation
to bargain with the

forces.

Migdal elaborates: "Lacking the means

internal support, leaders of

weak

states

[i.e.

states with

increasingly turn their attention to staying in

him an executive-military

may

weak

institutions]

the president relatively

must

may

the military

little,

yet winning

interpret the president's implicit alliance as a

auto-golpel ) to their institution and

with the president)

mobilize sustained and organized

alliance that could reinforce his negotiating position vis-a-vis
the

fractious legislature. That legislature

(

to

power ...." 86 Accordingly,

win a periodic perk, through bargaining, costing

threat

it

in return for the

trough. Guillermo O’Donnell

may

opt to take a short-term loss,

promise of the being able to preserve

dubbed

this sort

(i.e.

work

their patronage

of executive phenomenon, which appears to

be authoritarian rule under the guise of democracy, "delegative democracy." Under
concept, the will of the people

is

embodied

the national level, regardless of the

acknowledges

this

manner

in the president's ability to "get things

in

which

that is

this

done"

at

accomplished. Hunter

type of presidential strategy, but dismisses

it

as a

symptom

of a

weak

individual in the executive. Yet, her analysis of the Brazilian congress presents a system so

divided

among

weaknesses,

individual interests, that any president, regardless of his strengths or

may

be forced

at

one point or another

of "swing vote."

39

to resort to using the military as a type

3.5

The Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994-?)

Fernando Henrique Cardoso has demonstrated

that

he understands the importance,

perhaps more than anyone, of negotiating with the military.
His Real plan has been
considered one of the world's economic success

much

belt-tightening,

stories.

87

has nonetheless required

It

from which the armed forces have not escaped. The

military's

budget situation, regardless of the $200 million yearly allocation for
equipment

Humorous

dismal.

stories of

plight abound, such as soldiers

its

training are only allowed to fire five real bullets or the
to

meet United Nations' peacekeeping

differentiates this sacrifice

from

efforts

due

that of the Collor presidency

18%

the

consumer

1995.

89

price index

in real

Meanwhile, on the

international scene,

with unfulfilled potential. Instead,

it is

now

Mercosur accord," and Cardoso appears

to

is

that

88

10 weeks of basic

first

However, what

Cardoso has brought

Under Cardoso

terms during the

improved from 41.3%

in

the National

seven months of 1995 and

January of 1994 to 1.4%

in

no longer

is

quite

serious tale of Brazil's inability

to a lack of funds.

Brazil to the cusp of the "elite club" of world powers.

Treasury's receipts grew by

more

who

is still

in

January of

Brazil regarded as the nation

being referred to as the "engine of the

want

to

expand upon

that distinction

by recently

leading negotiations in Europe to sign a free trade agreement between Mercosur and the
E.U.. In addition, there

Council.

3.5.1

is

growing

talk of Brazil's entry into the

United Nations Security

90

Human

Rights Accusations: Handle With Care

Despite

its

relative acquiescence in terms of

its

budget, the military in Brazil, like

its

neighboring Argentine counterpart, does not tolerate accusations of human rights violations
very easily. The military's self-written Amnesty
aversion, but

more

telling has

delve too deeply into

human

Law

of 1979

is

one example of

that

been the unspoken agreement amongst politicians not

rights investigations.

40

91

to

Cardoso, the radical scholar turned

politician, riding

on a wave of popular support, appeared,

less than

one year

into his

presidency, poised to defy that tacit understanding. 92
Reflective of his past as an
intellectual critic of the military
that

regime

government, he was revered by those

who

suffered under

persecution as their greatest hope for closure to that
troubling time.

s

Therefore, in August of 1995 the Brazilian government took
definitive steps towards

admitting responsibility for the disappearance of 136 Brazilians
between 1964 and the

establishment of the Amnesty

Law

of 1979. Cardoso

moved

to publish the

names of the

"disappeared" and agreed to pay reparations ranging from (R)$
100,000 to $150,000 to the
families of the victims.

The dilemma
segment of the

armed forces
military felt

was how

for Cardoso, however,

own

civilian population along with his

that were, in essence, being

was a

"just war."

to reconcile the interests of a vocal

personal inclinations with that of the

accused of wrongdoing for what many within the

Brian Loveman, describing the military's logic behind such

an assertion, notes:

At war, the

rules of

war apply. The basic

rule of

war

opponents become "enemies"
their extirpation is no longer a violation of human
but rather a legitimate function of armies engaged
killed.. ..If political

With

that mind-set, Cardoso's

and economic balance Cardoso had

upon a course of

in

combat.

’

93

announcement touched off minor barrack

around the nation. The matter had the potential

set

that the enemy may be
war, undeclared or declared,
rights or even a common crime
is

in a

to unravel

tried so hard to build.

internal diplomacy, first

by

As

revolts in bases

and threaten the

fragile political

Reacting quickly, the president

stating:

the Head of State and of the Government, elected by the people, and as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, it is up to me to assume, for the State,
94
the responsibilities of transgressions committed against the law or human rights.
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In

making such a pronouncement, Cardoso, deflected

"disappeared"

away from

the military.

However,

the responsibility of the

masked a more complex

this act

series of

negotiations between the executive and the armed forces.

Cardoso's military cabinet-members proved to be effective
possible civil-military

crisis.

The minister of the Army personally took

Rio's military headquarters so that the high

publication of the disappeared

list

command

would not lead

to torture investigations.

were advised" by the military cabinet

What

to the quality of the civil-military "deal"

two weeks

added

after the start of this incident, of a

armed forces a 20%
gratuity."

to failure,

95

the President to

could be directly assured that

frustrated officers
truly

allies in averting a

to retire

Meanwhile,

and collect

was Cardoso's

their pensions.

signing, less than

temporary measure which guaranteed the

salary readjustment along with an added, undefined
"provisional

Unlike Collor, whose aforementioned temporary measure attempt was
doomed

Cardoso enjoyed enough support within

the legislature to

make such

a tactic

feasible.

The "disappeared" episode perhaps more than any
history, succinctly defines the bargaining nature of

Cardoso needed
his principles

to

other incident in recent Brazilian

contemporary civil-military

prove (for present and future electoral success)

and accommodate the desires of the

that

relations.

he could stand by

civilian population, in areas other than

economics; while the military needed a pay increase. Thus, the President and the military

compromised. Each was

victorious:

Cardoso proved himself a champion of those whose

voices had been silenced, while the military could take refuge

of torture would be muted and they would,

in return,

42

in

knowing

that accusations

be given a salary bonus.

3.6 Conclusion

It is not in the army that one can find
the remedy for the
country.

De

The armed

Tocqueville,

forces in Brazil

seem

Democracy

in

ills

of the army but

America

be evolving along with transformations

to

in the

in their

country. Thirty years ago, the thought that the military would
have to compromise with a

government
the world

that enjoys

was trapped

little

or no respect in the barracks

Cold War mentality where

in a

was inconceivable. At

that time,

"threats" to national sovereignty

could come, not only across borders, but also from within. In the
mid-1990's, however,
talk of "subversion"

is

laughable. Moreover, borders themselves have less significance
as

expansion of the "global market" has made traditional enemies
partners (e.g. Brazil and Argentina).
also a product of

its

in the spotlight.

intimate trading

of the Brazilian military's "metamorphosis"

painful experience in government, where

armed forces were placed
to

Much

now

all

the shortcomings of the

Today, military contempt for

civilian

power has

be weighed against the damage a potential intervention could cause the military

itself;

one senior officer concluded, "We

as

of our own."

This

[the military]

offers

it

96

new

understanding, while weakening military dominance, has strengthened

mired by disunity, appears non-inclined

little in

international

president

is

return.

The

The

to continue supporting a military that

executive, confronted by a multiplicity of national and

demands, would also prefer

to ignore the

armed

forces. Nevertheless, the

cognizant that to allow the military's economic plight to deteriorate excessively

may pose problems
military

institution

have more than enough problems

Brazilian civil institutions' position, albeit within a defective political system.
legislature,

is

may

for the

smooth functioning of

create uncontrollable

rifts in

the

his policies.

Dissatisfaction within the

armed establishment

potentially leading to

sporadic, violent protests. Thus, the Brazilian executive appears content to allow the
legislature to tear

away

at the military's

budget, until

43

demands by

the

armed forces reach a

breaking point. In that scenario, and unlike the
traditional "tutelary" model, the civilian
president gains an "active" bargaining position vis-a-vis
the
threat to

him stems from

a possibility of a break in

(factionalism/mutinies); a danger of

its

chain of

aid"

such as strategic defense of the

little

Of course,

This concept, by

Amazon

(the

him

With

it

emperils

that "active" negotiating

97
.

to

pursue their internal, autonomous

These concessions can be doled out

(alliance) over the intransigent, divided legislature.

its

in civil-military relations

"involves cooperation versus defiance ." 98

very definition contradicts the democratic professionalist military

United States paradigm) that many scholars see as a goal for a true democracy.

In a democratic professionalist

as mission priorities

99
.

When

armed

forces, both civilian authority

and democracy are held

the president resorts to allying himself with the military he

reinforces the historically accepted notion, on the part of the

those prominent in Brazilian society, that liberal democracy
that

for officers as

the long-term repercussions of executive-military alliance-making
remain

be seen. Bargaining

model

military's

or no short-term cost to the executive and can actually profit
the president by

creating a military predilection for

to

The

able to manipulate the military by allocating economic
"band-

measures or by affording the armed forces leeway

interests

with

is

forces.

command

more paramount importance

the fundamental pillar-hierarchy-of the military institution.

advantage, the president

armed

armed forces and many of
is

somehow

inappropriate for

Portuguese-speaking country.
Executive-military negotiation,

in

circumventing the congress, violates a principal

tenet of the federalist democratic code: constitutional separation of

powers and checks and

balances. If Brazilian parties are not strengthened, this "delegative democratic" practice
will

most

likely continue. If so, the nation runs the risk that (a) the president

eventually monopolize governmental power or (b) the military
in its pre-requisites for

occurred

Peru under Fujimori and

in

latter [b] raises the threat

may become more

supporting the executive. The former

demanding

to a

degree

in

may

Argentina under

[a]

has already

Menem. While

of the armed forces developing an ethos of "conditional

44

the

subordination," whereby the executive

would

like.

Samuel Fitch

may

find himself forced to concede

more than he

notes:

Under

certain circumstances... civilian leaders may be able
to impose a substantial
degree of democratic control without institutionalization, for
example where the
political context leaves the military no other alternative.
Under these conditions
however, democratic control is likely to be unstable and transient;

circumstantial

changes

in the political

context— a prolonged bout of hyperinflation, the death
or
discrediting of the president, or increased political violence-may
re-open old
options or

Though
order,"

this

it

new

alternatives for military intervention

100
.

chapter has shown that a military coup seems unlikely in this
"new world

has also demonstrated that contemporary Brazilian civil-military relations
retain a

considerable degree of ambiguity. Civilians, today, cannot be considered prisoners
to
military dictates. Nevertheless, the
military bargaining escalate, this

armed

forces remain political actors. Should civil-

ambiguous co-existence may perpetuate an

inclination to

authoritarianism (civilian, military or both) with uncertain ramifications for the Brazilian

people.
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Istoe "Vespeiro cutucado," 8

Istoe, "Partido

verde

em

May

91: pp.20-21.

a?ao," 10 July 91: p.20.

It was noted in 1991, by a capt. in the
Reserves, that the Brazilian Army had proportionately
more
generals than the United States Army; a factor some junior
officers felt
-

military's financial woes.

December 9

1
:

5

Estado de Sdo Paulo
p.4 (as cited in Franko, p.54).

was partly to blame for
"Armed Forces Said Experiencing Raison D'etre

Lourdes Sola, "Estado, transformagao economica e democratiza$ao no
Brasil," p. 240,
Estado, mercado e democracia: Politico e economia comparadas, (Rio
de Janeiro: Paz

in

the

"

8

Lourdes Sola,

ed.,
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5

Istoe, Partido

verde

em

a?ao, 10 July 91:

Istoe Partido verde em.a^ao, 10 July 91:
,

e Terra, 1993).

p. 16.

p.16.
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See Glaucio Soares, Maria Celina D'Araujo, and Celso Castro,
Sobre 1964, (Rio de Janeiro: Relume Dumara, 1994).

Visoes do Golpe:

A Memoria

Militar

Colonel Manuel Rodriguez Solis, Deontologia Militar (Tratado de los deberes militares), comp.
Colonel
Juan Jose Solis Morales, (Guatemalea: Ministerio de la Defensa Nacional, 1964), p.35.
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58

59

60

Zaverucha, p.l

1.

Interamerican Development Bank-Annual Report 1993.

"A conta do

Istoe,

Salaries

and

desgaste," 3 June 92: p.26.

that many officers were forced
One such officer, an Army captain,

were so low

their families.

the weekends. Istoe, "Partido verde
61

62

6

Istoe,

"A conta do

Istoe,

"Longe do barulho:

em

to work second jobs in order to support themselves
admitted having sold sandwiches on the beach during

a^ao," 10 July 91; p.20.

desgaste," 3 June 1992: p.26.

oficiales preferem

nao se envolver na

crise," 9

September 92:

Interviews with senior officers involved in the 1964 coup reveal that the military's

p.23.

first

president,

Castello Branco, intended to return power to civilians as early as 1966-67, yet he was out- flanked by the

more conservative,

Chumbo
64

The result, as is well-known, was 18 more
See Glaucio Soares, Maria Celina D'Araujo, and Celso Castro, Anos de

hard-line faction of Gen. Costa e Silva.

years of military government.

(noted previously).

See Soares, D'Araujo, Castro, Visoes do golpe.
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3
7

,

“Guillermo O'Donnell, "Modernization and Military Coups: Theory,
Comparisons, and
Case, in Lowenthal and Fitch eds., Annies and Politics
in Latin America, p.l 13.
6b

the Argentine

An example

of the multiple economic problems brought on by the military
is that of the national growth
from 9% in 1974 to 4.8% in 1978, while the foreign debt jumped
from (U S )$32 billion to
$43.5 billion in the span of one year (77-78), yet the military in
1981 chose to "push ahead "" along
essentially the same lines." Schneider, pp.277, 289 and 295.
rate

which

fell

67

Brazil's economic problems of 1992-1993 were so acute that
they were cited as the sole cause for Latin
America's regional inflation rate increase. Had Brazil not been included in
the regional study. Latin America
would have actually experienced an easing in inflation figures. Economic
Survey of Latin America and the
Caribbean 1993, Vol.l (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1994)
p. 19.
,

68

J. Samuel Fitch, "Armies and Politics in Latin
America:
Armies and Politics in Latin America, p.32.

1975-1985,"

in

Lowenthal and Fitch

eds..

69

Similar to Guillermo O'Donnell's concept of "delegative democracy," whose
basic premise is that in some
nations the mere election of the president is interpreted as giving the president
"carte blanche" to pursue
politics the way he or she thinks best.
Guillermo O’Donnell, "Democracia delegativa?,"

CEBRAP
70

Novos Estudos

31 (Sao Paulo, Oct. 1991) as cited in Francisco Weffort, Qual Democracia?,
p.105.

President Franco appeared

Istoe, 2

March

at the

1994 Rio Carnaval intoxicated and accompanied by a known prostitute

94: p.30.

7

'As outlined earlier by Gen. Newton Cerqueira. A notion contrary to their historical distinct, superior
under which cooperation with civilian politics was despised as violating elaborate conceptions of
prestige and honor.
arbiter role

72

Consumer prices in 1992 in Brazil were calculated at 1, 149.1% while in 1993 the situation only
worsened rising to 2, 289.1%. To emphasize the impact of these numbers it is essential to note that no
Latin American country for those same years had consumer price figures over 60%
Economic Survey of
Latin America and the Caribbean 1993, Vol.l: Economic Trends in Latin American and the Caribbean,
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, (Santiago: United Nations, 1994), p.51.
!

7

that FHC at first did not want to touch the Economics ministry, opting instead
be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which actually helped him for his economics role, allowing him to
cultivate many international contacts. See Dominguez (forthcoming).

The economy was so bad

to

74

75

76

See Dominguez.
Istoe,

"Quepe no

Istoe,

"O vermelho

topete," 15

December

1993: pp. 23-25.

e o verde," 12 January 1994: pp. 22-24.

7

The first payment had originally been scheduled
"Fim do regime," 2 March 94: p.67.

1%
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80

81

lstoe,

"Fim do regime," 2 March 94:

for

1993 but had been shelved by the government.

p.67.

Istoe, "Itamar

chama

a guarda," 30

March

94: pp. 34-36.

Istoe, "Itamar

chama

a guarda," 30

March

94: pp. 34-36.

Rouquie, p.285.
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~Istoe,
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doutrina," 6 September 95:
pp. 26-27.
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Joel

Migdal,

"A Model
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Comparative Politics (Boulder: Westview
8

Relations,"

in

Howard Wiarda, ed„ New Directions
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p.l.

Migdal, p.55.
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Press, 1991), p. 55.

Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1971),
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See Dominguez.
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mal armadas," 6 September 95: p.28.
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1995,
(Santiago, Chile:
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Is toe,

for Latin America and the Caribbean, Economic
Panorama of Latin AmericaUnited Nations, 1995), p.27.

"Cartao de credito," 27 September 95: pp.24-25.

91

Illustrative of this seeming "agreement" is the apparent lack
of any government investigation
numerous discoveries, during Collor's presidency, of mass graves dating back to the
military

regime

3 April 94:

into
Is toe

p.26.

"Cardoso's father was a military general and even though Cardoso was arrested
and exiled to Chile for three
years in 1964, he was allowed to return and given the freedom to establish his own
opposition think tank,
which would most likely not be possible without the immunity gained from family ties.
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Brian

Loveman, "Human Rights and Protecting the Patria: An (Almost) Military Perspective." Paper
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CHAPTER 4

DEFINING DEMOCRACY IN ARGENTINA VIA CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS

In analyzing Brazilian civil-military relations,
the

measuring standard was the

United States model of a professional military subordinated
to democratic civilian control.

However,

as the Brazilian case illustrated, the democratic
discourse

An

worldwide.

scientist Atilio

an

Boron has noted

that

nowhere

in the

Argentine constitution can one even

1

Ultimately what has emerged in both Brazil and
Argentina

amalgam of liberal democratic
In this environment,

reality.

not uniform

analysis of Argentina reinforces that understanding.
Argentine political

word "democracy."

find the

is

is

principles adapted (mutated?) to a particular political

some elements of a democracy

are accepted

and implemented

while others remain alienated as symbols of weakness.
In Argentina, President

Raul Alfonsm was elected

open democracy and a mandate of bringing the military
declared.

Democracy cannot

the arbiters of sovereignty,
interests

above

Alfonsm hoped

new

live in this

in

to justice.

country while the

and with an Armed Forces

their professional obligations."'

The

1983 with a commitment

Armed

His campaign platform
Forces set themselves as

that place their

first

to

own

corporate

post-authoritarian executive,

to create a strong democratic foundation for the future of Argentina. This

Argentina, he hoped, was to be imbued with respect for the separation of powers and

with intrinsic military subordination. Thus,

in Alfonsin's perception, civil-military

bargaining would not be a necessity. Severely fractured, the disgraced and humiliated

armed forces appeared,

in

1983, to be in no position to contest this

new

executive outlook.

Alfonsin's optimism hinged on one key issue: the speedy and neat resolution of

human
was

rights trials.

that his

Without

it,

nothing else would be possible. The dilemma for Alfonsm

conception of justice would only prosecute the

men

in

charge (the military

junta members) during the Proceso de Reorganization National and amnesty the vast
majority of lower and middle-ranking officers

However

whom

for the thousands of families of those

51

he

felt

were simply following

who had been

orders.

kidnapped, tortured and

murdered

in the quest for ideological

conformity, orders to terrorize were not
warranted

and could not be excused. These families clamored

for vindication; for the

punishment of

the murderers of their individual son, daughter,
parent, and so on. President Alfonsin,

adamant about eliminating any
powers ultimately allowing the

hint of elite "deal-making," abided

by the separation of

multiplicity of civilian legal claims through
the judiciary to

determine the course of his presidency. Ironically, the
national zeal to punish the military
establishment re-united the divided armed forces and led to
a succession of military
rebellions that ultimately forced Alfonsin, reluctantly, to
the civil-military bargaining table.
In a nation

reeling

still

from the nightmare of

the military government, this "surrender,"
on

the part of the president, coupled with his failing

economics was disastrous. Eventually,

the exigencies of faithfulness to democratic rule took their

toll

on Raul Alfonsin leading him

to retire in 1989.

Alfonsm's self-defeating passion for democracy ultimately displayed

weaknesses and
Carlos

Menem,

Menem has

led, in part, to his collapse as a viable national leader.

armed

his political psyche.

Viewing

politics as a

end and democracy

delegative democracy model,

as a

zero-sum game,

mere

Menem favors

detail.

was elected

to a

second term

The Presidency of Raul

Elected

in 1983,

Conforming

be one more example of
sees centralized

to the

power

O'Donnell

accomplishments, rather than democracy.

The public appears

He

to agree,

in 1995.

Alfonsin: Prioritizing

Democracy

Raul Alfonsin faced a military

Argentine history. Economic

to

Menem

sees these as the ultimate measuring stick of his presidency.

4.1

His successor.

forces, circumventing laws created to curb

such a practice. His revisionist approach to the military appears

as he

many

learned from those mistakes and has taken a determined reverse course.

actively negotiated with the

as the ultimate

his

failure,

rampant

that

was

at its

internal divisiveness,

52

lowest point

in

and the shame of the

Malvinas fiasco had taken a heavy

toll

on the armed

condemnation of the armed establishment was
ideal time to eliminate the military's "reserve

forces.

intense.

3

Moreover, public

Alfonsm

realized that this

domain" of power within Argentine

was

the

society.

Negotiation with the armed forces, Alfonsm hoped,
would soon become a thing of the
past.

His goal, as well as that of the nation, was the
subordination of the armed forces

civilian authority

and the creation of a vibrant democracy; a

to

relatively novel concept to the

Argentine people. 4
Shortly after he took office, Alfonsm began his
quest for greater military
accountability.

He reduced

the defense budget by half, forced two-thirds
of the

army

generals and one-third of the navy admirals into retirement,
and discharged three-quarters

of the conscripts. In addition, he cut the salaries of officers
and NCO's.
civilian Ministry of

He

Defense overseeing the different service branches. As a

also created a
result of

Alfonsfn's initiative, the National Security Doctrine which had
originally fed the flames of
military intervention in the 1970 s

emergence of democratic

was

repealed.

This did not, necessarily, represent the

civil-military relations, yet as

Samuel Fitch noted,

"the lack of a

clear anti-democratic alternative [was] at least a modest step forward relative
to the 1960’s

and 1970's." 6
For the elimination of the National Security Doctrine

Alfonsm and

his party, the

Union Civica Radical (UCR),

to

have any true

effect,

realized that any internal military

policing function needed to be excised. The Internal Service Regulations of the Argentine

Army

in

1983

still

defined the military's role

as:

...safeguarding the highest national interests of the Nation. ..to defend its honor,
of the Argentine Nation and its law, guaranteeing the

its

territory, the Constitution

maintenance of

The highly

internal

peace and insuring the normal operation of

7

its

institutions.

subjective definition of "internal peace" had been used too often as an excuse

for military coups. Thus, debate began in 1984 to create a National Defense

up any dangerous ambiguity. The law, which was eventually passed

53

Law

to clear

in 1988, "stated

unequivocally that internal security and political
intelligence was banned for the
armed
forces.

8

Toward

same end, Alfonsfn

this

also replaced

all

the military officers in the

nation’s intelligence agency, the Secretariat of
State Intelligence

de Estado— SIDE) with

4.1.1

Human

In

Rights:

civilians.

The Burden of History Becomes Heavier

one of his most anticipated post-authoritarian

military's self-amnesty shortly after taking office.
essential, as only

burden of the

Secretaria de Inteligencia

(.

through a

trial

acts,

Alfonsfn repealed the

The President viewed

this decision as

of the Proceso leaders would the nation rid

itself

of the

Unfortunately for Alfonsfn, that same act released the collective

past.

repression of the nation and ultimately led to his political demise.

Alfonsfn was cognizant of the special role
military had occupied for years.
rights violations

would only close

psychological purpose of the

examine

its

foresaw that a military hunted by civilians for human

in

trials.

Argentine politics and society that the

on

The

itself

and become defensive; defeating the

president

felt that

the military

needed

role in the "dirty war" to purge itself of the seeds of evil that

commit such

own

He

in

officers.

atrocities.

However,

Thus, he

initially

to self-

had led

allowed military courts to determine the

the military hearings proved problematic since

many

to

it

fate of

officers

considered the eradication of subversion as the only "victory" of the entire Proceso. This

was

clearly evident in official military literature published as late as 1983. In

military entitled

its

"Final

Document of the

Military Junta Regarding the

addressed,

[subversion]
victory.

9

it

the

War Against

Subversion and Terrorism: The Fundamental Concepts," the armed forces

It is

what

stated:

first of all, to us, the people of the nation victim of an aggression
did not deserve, invaluable and dedicated participant in the final

(emphasis mine)
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its

1

The

military courts

were unable

to reach a decision, but nevertheless
concluded "that the

orders issued by the juntas during the Proceso
to combat terrorism were
'unobjectionable.'" 10

Faced with the

Commission on

military's judicial intransigence, Alfonsfn
created the National

the Disappearances of Persons

arduous process of civilian

trials

(CONADEP).

of senior officers accused of

This body began the

human

rights atrocities.

Eventually five of the nine military junta members
were found guilty and imprisoned.

4.

1

.

1

.

1

The Media Factor and Pandora's Box

The demise of the Proceso

also represented the

restrained press hungry for the truth that

it

end of media censorship.

had been denied, televised the junta's

delved deeper into the buried facts of the cases ultimately discovering
multiple
military atrocities.

1

The very

visible defiance with

A

long-

trials

tales

and

of

which many of the accused conducted

themselves during the hearings along with the descriptions of torture and
murder pressured
the nation
officers.

s

representatives to push for the extension of the

Such a move, both Alfonsfn and

human

the military realized, had incredible

ramifications. Alfonsfn had felt that only the Proceso leadership
rest

rights trials to junior

was

truly culpable as the

of the military was simply carrying out orders. However, gruesome revelations

brought to the national attention whipped the populace into a frenzy. 12
Since officers had been rotated frequently during the dirty war
contact with "subversives," hundreds were implicated

to

in the repression.

avoid prolonged

13

Alfonsfn,

struggling to control the nation's shaky economy, decided that the democratic course of
action he had allowed to unfold

now

submitted to Congress a Punto Final
bill

imposed a 60 day deadline

required
bill

some

control.

In

December of 1986 he

(Spanish expression meaning "final stop"). This

for submission of

55

any new military indictments.

4.

1

.2

Military Factionalism: Irreconcilable Differences?

Unfortunately for Alfonsm, Punto Final backfired
dealing the civilian government
a harsh blow. Constrained by a 60 day time period,
civilians rushed to the courts to
law-suits against as
officers

were

many

officers as possible.

In the span of those

file

two months, 400

indicted. This occurrence exacerbated the military's
fears that

would be

it

decimated. Therefore, unlike the Brazilian military, clear-cut
factions that had been
dividing the armed forces since the time of the Proceso
became extreme.

who were most

officers

senior

command which

implicated in the

human

rights violations felt

coup would have had

little if

s

trial

behind them so as to repair the wounds within

in the

viewed the world as a

the

A concerted

commanders,

in civilian affairs.

like

most

They wanted

to

their institution.

Without active senior support, many of the accused mid-level
sought leadership

abandoned by

dilemma.

eye. Moreover, the senior

Argentines, considered the Proceso enough meddling
it

lower

any civilian support, thus further discrediting an

already vilified institution in the public

put

to

appeared more concerned with keeping the military unified. 14
The

senior leadership realized that there were few solutions for the
military

Mid

officers instead

fundamentalist faction of the armed forces. The fundamentalists

battle

between good and

evil,

where the

threat of subversion

was

omnipresent. Their mission was the restore a messianic-like "Truth." The fundamentalist
leaders, Lt. Col.

Aldo Rico and Col. Muhamed

in Argentina's foreign policy.

would be

actively involved in

15

They yearned

government

Seineldin, desired a stronger military voice

for a tutelary role

initiative.

where the armed forces

Nevertheless, most of the officers that

sought refuge amongst the fundamentalists upon passage of the Punto Final law did not
accept the group's dogma, but
available within the

armed

felt that

it

was

forces "family."

the only voice of support and defense

16
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4.

1 .2.

1

The Fundamentahst/Carapmtada

The fundamentalist
senior leadership,

termination of

many

human

of

Rebellions: Enter Bargaining

faction eventually mutinied during

whom

Holy Week of 1987 The

agreed with the basic principle of the rebellion-

rights accusations-did not participate,
but resisted putting

down

the

mutiny. Unlike the coup of 1976, the mutineers
had no intention of overthrowing

government, particularly since they would have had no
public support and most
backing from the armed forces as a whole. Instead

institutional

of solidarity

among

officers

who

felt

theirs

was a

likely

forceful

no

show

they were being deprived of recognition
for their valor

during what they perceived as a just war. Rebellion leader,
Lt. Col. Aldo Rico stated "To
all

Argentines of good

Forces problem.

17

faith:

Yet,

it

Do

not be fooled, this

was a "problem"

is

that very

not a coup,

much was

it

is

an internal

Armed

related to the civilian

government.
Despite massive civilian public demonstrations against the uprising,
Alfonsm
appears to have bargained with the military. Soon after the incident,
Congress passed the

"Due Obedience Law" which granted judicial immunity
Patrice

to nearly all mid-level officers.

McSherry, echoing the sentiment of many Argentines

Alfonsm may not have needed
rationale

may have been

the military

and second:

to

at the time,

notes that

accede to military demands. 18 However, Alfonsfn's

two-fold. First, he had never wanted to try the lower echelons of
if

he refused

to cooperate with the

armed forces

at that juncture,

they would remain a thorn in his side and divert his attention away from equally,

more, pressing issues such as the economy which during the Easter

Week

if

rebellion

not

was

undergoing a series of "draconian" shocks. 19

As was

the case for the civilians with the

the bargaining process

it

was

trials

difficult to control the

of the officers, once Alfonsm began

pent-up demands on the part of the

fundamentalist faction. Between 1987 and 1988 two more uprisings occurred, yet only the
latter

was of any

real

consequence. With passage of the National Defense

57

Law

in 1988, the

military

s

internal security role was, for the

most

exacerbated fundamentalist antagonism. As
a
three mutinies erupted that

had

as goals the

part, officially eliminated.

Dec. of 1988, the largest of the

result, in

pardon of

This only

all

imprisoned Proceso participants,

higher salaries, and the expulsion of numerous
senior officers. Once again Alfonsfn
negotiated with the armed forces. Shortly, thereafter
they received a salary increase and
the

Army

Chief of Staff was removed.

To understand why

Alfonsfn seemed to so easily accede to military
demands one

needs to examine the greater socio-political and economic
picture
nearing

400%

in

1988. Inflation

was

a year and early political polls predicted a Peronist
party victory in the 1989

presidential elections.

Both of these

factors,

combined with

the fact that theirs

was

the first

democratically-elected government in years, led to a "sense of
desperation" within
Alfonsfn's Radical party and in the nation as a whole. 20 With the
government under

mounting pressure
chaos, yet

it

was

to resolve the nation's problems, the rebellious faction

also the easiest problem to deal with.

resolved one dilemma and could

move

onto the next.

even though the overburdened Alfonsfn conceded
not agree to the mutineers' central demand:

4. 1.2.2

to the

With a few concessions, Alfonsfn

Of course,

it is

important to note that

most of the military

pardons for

all

Proceso

requests, he did
officers.

"Catch-22"

The

bitter irony

of the

human

rights trials

no wave of indictments of junior

there been

most

full

to

added

likely

have accommodated themselves

and the resultant rebellions was

officers, the

to

that

had

Argentine armed forces would

obeying constitutional

authorities.

The

senior leadership, and the majority of the officer corps, unlike the fundamentalist faction,

was more

interested in

mending

the divisions of

prerogatives. This understanding

Argentine officer

in

its

was succinctly

1985:

58

Proceso past than

reflected in the

in

contesting civilian

comments of one

The armed

forces [should stick to] an ascetic, integrated
professionalism

their
0n a tasks ‘"^ The armed forces should not govern;
[they] can't governn-ih
i !i
[they] don t know how to govern.. ..As many
times as they have tried, the military
always ends up losing the most. When [the armed

0 fe S

[tol

^,

'

their professional tasks, [they]

don

forces] dedicate themselves to

have time for other things

t

21
.

Besides not being able to govern, the Malvinas debacle
demonstrated to the world that the

Argentine military was not even capable of winning a
conventional war; the basic puipose
of any armed forces. The military
essential mission.

armed

The

command

felt their institution

needed

to re-focus

resignation brought on by this realization explains,
in part,

forces accepted drastic cuts in their size and budget
without

much

on

that

why

the

complaint. Alfred

Stepan elaborates;

Empirically such an absence of military contestation would be most
likely to occur
within the overall context of a sociopolitical situation that
approximates
the
"restoration” path of redemocratization. In such a path the military
might accept a
reduction of their prerogatives without contestation if such a pattern
of low

prerogatives were seen as an integral part, by both the military and the
civilian
leaders, of the overall model of governance and of civil-military
relations that is
22
being restored
.

Yet,
to.

Alfonsm was incapable of maintaining

The

that sense of shared

president's respect for the separation of

purpose that Stepan alludes

powers between the executive and the

judiciary restricted his control of the course of "redemocratization." Allowing the
rights trials to multiply, against his personal judgment, he (as the

society) attacked a "high prerogative" area of the military.

The

human

embodiment of civilian

trials, in

combination with

constant verbal assaults in the media and on the streets, led the military to close in upon
itself; to

prepare for what

many

within the institution perceived as their "last stand."

Ultimately, Alfonsfn's sense of being a democratic pioneer would cost him his
presidency.
late.

Wendy

He had

refused to intervene in the proceedings of the judiciary until

Hunter,

in

it

an analysis that seems particularly apropos, has paralleled

military relations in Argentina with the international relations

59

was too
civil-

model of the "chicken game."

Extrapolating Hunter's model, one concludes that
had Alfonsfn pre-empted the civilian
judicial onslaught

needed

to

by limiting the

accommodate

trials to just the

military junta initially, he

the military ("to swerve"). In not doing
so he

forced to bargain with the military. Yet the military

because the uprisings tore away
its

at its

itself

"swerved"

little

in this scenario

foundation of discipline and hierarchy and
threatened

Menem.

The Presidency of Carlos Saul Menem:

Carlos

Menem was elected

in

War, a "new world order" was on
inherited

from Alfonsfn

Menem's

particular conception of

Accomplishments

civilian directives,

Menem

the horizon.

and with the end of

interpreted

power was steeped

He viewed

4.2.1

Menem's

Menem's

first

mentality that required

is

move

greater democracy. His personal,

was so severe

for Argentina, however,

in 1983, yet

that drastic

by the

late

measures were called

that the crisis of the early 90's has since

authoritarianism continues.

Political Identity:

For any analysis of

must

Cold

the Argentine presidency as a vehicle to

however not necessarily towards

980's and early 90's national instability

disappeared, yet

the

most of the problems he

in a corporatist

almost authoritarian leadership, would not have been possible

The problem

The economy was

as a product of indecision and lack of strong leadership. 24

near absolute centralized control.
the nation forward,

Prioritizing

a period of incredible uncertainty.

plummeting, the military was challenging

for.

economy and

national respect, Alfonsfn resigned in 1989 and opened
the door for the election

of a Peronist, Carlos Saul

4.2

never have

was eventually

future as an integrated institution. 23 Nevertheless, in
the face of a broken

with

1

may

truly

Keys

to the

Kingdom

contemporary civil-military relations

understand the political psyche of Carlos
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Menem. Unlike

in

Argentina, one

the Brazilian

experience, he has been his nation's only
post-Cold

he would warrant a deeper discussion. Yet,

endurance

becomes

in the executive, rather for

clear,

one

how he

and the new

become a world

in politics.

He

more noteworthy not

has maintained that power.

for his

Once

this

''player” in

provinces of Argentina.

If

at the

an eccentric mix of

same time he promotes

neo-liberal ideology.

He

terms of international politics and business,
yet displays

one were

coined by Atilio Boron

Menem represents

displays strong populist tendencies, derived
from his

some of the most conservative tendencies

that

is

scholars have noted that

Peronist party background, while

has

Menem

president. For that reason alone

will be able to see the rationale for
his dealings with the military.

Numerous Argentine
the old

War

who

traditionally associated with the

to label

Menem, perhaps

"backwoods"

the best description

would be

referred to the president as a "neo-conservative." 25

Menem's "neo-conservatism" may appear

internally contradictory, yet there

is

a

strong central belief that undergirds Menemista politics:
personalism and a Thomistic/

Upon

corporatist philosophy.

many

of the

political

traits

close examination,

Menem

appears to have transplanted

of the traditional regional caudillo (rural landed patriarchs

and economic

life in

most of Latin America)

to the national level.

who

Boron

controlled
outlines

the president's understanding of politics and his role vis-a-vis society in
three levels:

1. Society is a natural organism where all the parts must
co-habitate in harmony. If
not there will be anarchy.
2.Social conflict is merely an expression of personal interests clashing. There are
no 'structural contradictions' or 'unresolvable antagonisms.'
3. No solution is possible without approval of the center. 26

This

tripartite

model has

the levels building

unrest.

it

He

neatly into the uncertainty of a post-Cold

War Argentina,

with

upon themselves.

Like the caudillo
has taken

fit

who

resolved any problem

upon himself to solve

in his

the issues of the military, the

has bypassed the institutional support that

(which currently holds a majority

province personally,

in

is

economy, and

available to

Menem

social

him through

his party

congress) and defied the authority of the legal system
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to

"go

it

assumed

alone." Apparently feeling that the
world had drastically changed since
Alfonsin
the presidency in 1983,

Menem

chose to accommodate the transforming

Rather than abiding by notions of democracy
which were not ingrained
society- and which seemed, to

-Menem

Menem

sought instead to apply his

at least, to

own brand

immediate post-Cold War. As international

vacuum of the time allowed

the political

reality.

Argentine

in

have brought about Alfonsin's downfall-

of politics to the chaotic world of the

relations theorist

David Campbell

for such an approach.

Campbell

describes,

writes:

The nexus between

the moment of these events and the
power of this mode of
be found in the contention that we live in a
distinctive political time
marked by the absence of a corresponding political space;
that is to say, the activity
of politics is no longer (assuming it once was)
concomitant with the

analysis

is

to

politics (the state). Indeed, these

both

enclosure of

changes and our

made

ability to

comprehend them

is

possible by, and helps constitute, the political
contours of the latemodern period; contours that might be characterized in terms
of the globalization of
contingency, the erasure of the markers of certainty, and
the rarefaction of political
discourse. ...This globalization of contingency, this irruption
of contingency not
only renders problematic the traditional spatializations of

power

alliances, political parties),

it

(e.g. states,

renders problematic the discursive practices which

have made those spatializations of power possible. 27

Menem has

ruled largely by decree which

is

compatible with his notion of society as having

no "unresolvable antagonisms." The president
political life

mandated by

deepened with greater
state

the electorate, can solve any problem. This sentiment

strides

political society resolves.

28

arbitration

make him appear

to

as a

armed

forces.

the

Finally, like the caudillo, maintenance of his

"good payer of political favors;" a reputation

interaction with the

only

be "the" axis

personalistic rule requires doling out of privileges; in other words, clientelism.

known

is

toward complete neo-liberalism. The "downsizing" of

and the lack of a doctrine of government

upon which

feels that only he, as the center of national

29
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that has

He

become evident

is

in his

4.2.2

Menem:

Personality v. Institution

Menem
may

doing so

has effectively silenced the military issue in Argentina,
yet his methods for

leave an unwanted legacy.

as Alfonsin reluctantly

was forced

to

do

He

has not only bargained for political "space,”

in the

end of

his regime, he has, in effect

consolidated the military around him as an individual rather than
around the office of the
president. His

cannot

in

example of decree

rule,

along with his concessions to the armed forces,

any way serve as a model for democratic professionalism (obedience

democracy and

The

among

civilian authority)

military, both

1989 as the resolver of

The

different reasons.

fundamentalists (also

its

the

men

in

to

arms.

leadership and the fundamentalist faction, looked to

their long-standing

complaint regarding

human

Menem

in

rights trials, yet for

senior leadership wanted the issue settled hoping that the

known

as carapintadas),

who had been

would then fade from prominence. The command corps

tearing the institution apart,

realized that the rebellious officers

resented any senior efforts of accommodation on the issue of the
translated into a serious discipline

problem

trials.

That resentment

as the natural order of the military hierarchy

was

threatened. Meanwhile, the leaders of the fundamentalist faction expected the resolution of
the

trial

dilemma

to be a first step

toward a greater voice

in

government,

in other

words,

active tutelage.

4.2.2.

1

Military

Amnesty

The carapintadas sought
would "defend
questionable,

would have

to gain

his victory with arms."

however

it

to deal with

may have

Menem

military alliance in Brazil).

30

As

Menem's favor by making

How much

this threat

instilled fear in the

as president

(much

it

known

that they

helped Menem's campaign

Radical party congressmen

like Franco's

is

who

Real plan executive-

a consequence of this military backing and a reflection of

63

the president s personalist approach,

pardons of nearly

all

Menem, soon

after his election, issued

the Proceso officers, imprisoned or under
indictment.

had feared doing because of both a respect for democracy
and of possible
repercussions,

The
model.

Menem

Menem

Menem s

pardons

Proceso and during

its

their individual spheres.

On

the other hand, civilians

hunting the armed forces through the

Menem

felt that

structural defect

its

The

had

bounds

tried

in

civil judiciary.

No

solution

in this

all

problems

structural defect (there could be

like the

(in simplistic

no

terms) he saw

Menem's

issue, affirmed his "essentiality" in

made without

case Argentina.
Parties

and

failed during Alfonsfn's tenure to resolve the

intervention,

Argentine

more importantly than resolving

politics.

the

Like the caudillo's ranch where no

the caudillo's cognizance, Argentina

Menem would take credit for a grand accomplishment on

was Menem's

the part of the military,

also prepared to bear the brunt of civilian hostility. Regardless, in

Menem's

understanding both sides' reactions would serve the same purpose: they would re-affirm
his

preeminence

parties,

in

it

Hobbesian Leviathan, was looking

would be possible without Menem's involvement.

democracy had

lingering military problem.

decision could be

Menem,

good of the whole;

the other institutions of

was

their

It

because society was an "organism"). Therefore, he did not view his

out for the greater

yet he

the

all

military, both in the

he could resolve any social problem because

as a solution to a misunderstanding.

"ranch."

organism

"place" in society.

pardon as a symptom of continued military dominance, rather

Third:

this

had overextended

from confusion and were not representative of a

resulted

electoral

clearly understood using Boron's tripartite

various mutinies had overstepped

to effect civilian policy.

Second:

is

viewed society as a natural organism. In

must co-habitate, yet within

entities

What Alfonsm

quickly dealt with.

rationale for

First,

two sweeping

Argentina's existence, casting an imposing shadow on the congress,

and the judiciary.
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Beyond

all

the machinations of the

afforded political maneuverability

of the nation

1989-1990.

in

A

Menem political

in issuing the military

psyche, the president was

amnesty because of the sentiment

1990 national opinion poll found

that

70.6% of the

population of greater Buenos Aires disapproved of the pardons,
yet the survey also
highlighted Argentine

s

more immediate concerns. With

1990 and national un- and underemployment

low on the

at

inflation

an unprecedented

skyrocketing— 1800% for

16%

3

'-the military was

of people's priorities (table 4.1).

list

Table 4.1
Question: Which of the following problems do you consider most grave 9
December 1990-Federal Capitol and Greater Buenos Aires
Capitol

Greater Buenos Aires

%
Low

salaries

Military issue

Administrative corruption
Foreign debt
Education
Inflation

Bankruptcy

Human

%

27.6
00.5
21.6
05.0
13.0
04.0
03.8
02.5

Rights

26.8
03.3
18.0
02.5
10.0
10.3

09.0
01.5

Unemployment

14.3

10.3

Drugs

04.3
03.5
100

07.5
01.0
100

Health
Total
Source: Rosendo Fraga, Menem y
Nueva Mayoria, 1991), p.149.

Once

(Buenos Aires: Centro de Estudios Union para

the pardons were issued, military contention

leaders such as Lt. Col.
political

la cuestion militar,

movement
As

disappointed.

was muted. Fundamentalist

Aldo Rico and Col. Muhamed Seineldfn had hoped

to build a

within the military upon the general amnesty, however both were soon

the senior military leadership had been aware of for years, the

carapintadas' real cohesion had resided
just war; not in

la

any nationalistic/tutelary

in the fear

of imprisonment for what they

political ideology.

felt

was

Emblematic of this sentiment,

interviews conducted by Samuel Fitch in 1985 and again in 1992 of over 100 Argentine
officers

found

that

Furthermore, only

none favored the "guardian of national

1%

in

security/tutelary model."

1985 supported a "conditional subordination model," with

65

that

a

figure dwindling to

0%

in

1992 .“ One

officer, in a

1992 interview, rejected the potential

for future military intervention in Argentina
with a reference to the complexity of the

new

"globalized" world:

This

is not the role of the armed forces,
not in Argentina. [These are] different
situations, different levels of culture, different
transitions, and different political
6 Ar ^ ent ' ne militar h as 136611 burned; they want
y
nothing to do with
”

olitiS

The

officers

very

much

4.2.2. 2

may

feel that they

want nothing

do with

to

politics, but

Military: Vehicle for

Menem's

budget, and holdings of the armed forces. U.S.
calculated a decline in the military budget from

GDP

much

made them

Political Identity

Concurrent with his neo-liberal economic philosophy,

sold

has

a part of his political agenda.

The

1.9% of

Menem

in

1991.

34

Menem has

reduced the

Control and Disarmament

3.9% of the Argentine

GDP in

size,

statistics

1989

to

also eliminated the national conscription system and

of the military's property using the

modernize a stream-lined armed

Arms

Menem has

forces.

Such

money

to off-set military debt

presidential

and

to

moves, particularly the

elimination of the draft, would appear to threaten traditional military prerogatives. Yet, a

1992 poll indicated
contrast to the

88%

that only

4% of Argentine officers viewed Menem negatively,

disapproval rating that Alfonsfn mustered during his term. 35

explains this great disproportion?

much

of which

is

The explanation

lies in

Menem's

in stark

What

political philosophy,

based on a system of bargains (favors with the implicit understanding

that loyalty is required).

Considering himself the axis upon which Argentine society revolves,

pursued a series of negotiations with the armed forces

McSherry created a "guardian democracy

that have, in the

Menem

words of

Patrice

via executive-military alliance." Unlike the

66

has

Brazilian situation with

view the armed forces
saturating the

its still

positively.

media on a

was

36

New

revelations recently about the "dirty war,"

daily basis, have

Moreover, most scholars agree
rights trials

cohesive and respected military, most Argentines
do not

done nothing

that the Argentine

over, purged itself of most,

faction. In such a national context

seem highly unlikely

that

if

not

armed

forces,

all, its

fundamentalist/interventionist

and with such an

success.

38

once the issue of human

internal institutional mentality

any coup, whether a concerted

would have any chance of

to ameliorate that situation. 37

As Paul Zagorski

it

would

effort or a "wildcat-type" affair

notes:

Risk-benefit analysis has clearly swung against intervention.
Today if the armed
forces disagree with the government on policy, those
disagreements do not entail
the survival of the armed forces as an institution. Nothing
on the horizon has the
salience for the military that the rights issue did. Nothing is
likely to induce the
same degree of unity of military opinion. Nor is any other issue liable to evoke
a
similar willingness among officers to risk their careers and undermine
military
obedience. Military unrest may have compelled the government to

back down on

the rights

trials,

themselves.

As proof of this

but

Few

was

also a wrenching experience for the
officers seem willing to repeat it. 39

analysis, a

it

1990 rebellion by fundamentalist officers who wanted a greater

say in government policy was quickly crushed by the military

itself.

Contrary to Brazil, even contention on budgetary issues
Brazil adapted to an interest-group existence because

symbol of order and
option.
to

With no

have very

relative purity.

it

could

is

still

low-key. The military

little

public appeal, the

armed

leverage with which to bargain with civil society. Yet,

pursued a series of acts

that

Menem

ominously, on the other hand, centralized greater power under the president.

that

forces appear

has

have on the one hand cushioned the budget cuts and more

67

in

appeal to the public as a

However, the Argentine armed forces do not have

desire of intervention and with

little

armed forces

4.2.3 Negotiating a Civil-Military "Intimacy"

The

political

world according

and authoritarianism.

Much

of

to

Menem has

Menem's

walked a

fine line

between democracy

actions in the executive, such as his
hundreds of

decrees, have clearly violated democratic norms.
His interaction with the military has only

added

to the sense of authoritarianism.

On

a pure level of appearances,

Menem

has taken

nearly every opportunity to both socialize with and
praise the military establishment.

He

has gone so far as regarding the dirty war (a period during
which he spent 5 years as a
political prisoner) a valiant

and noble endeavor. Whereas Alfonsfn was seen

enforcer of civilian mandates,
civil-military

military deals

Menem's

social

as the alien

approach has opened very basic avenues of

communication. This new intimacy has been formalized with numerous

and manipulations

that cast

civil-

even greater doubt on the future of democracy

in

Argentina.

4.2.3.

1

Internal Intelligence

Menem's
in the

The

efforts in the area of internal intelligence

context of a nation that

still

issue of national intelligence

mourns
is

one of

have been particularly troubling

the deaths of thousands labeled as subversives.
distinct

resonance

in all nations

with

authoritarian histories. In Brazil, President Collor's disbandment of the military-run

SNI

appeared to release society from one more bond of military repression. Of course, as has

been shown, the shuffling of armed forces personnel neutralized much of the
political

move.

In Argentina, with

its

much more

eliminated the remnants of military presence
(Secretarfa de Inteligencfa de
civilians.

Menem, however,

military personnel to

many

effect of that

violent past, President Alfonsfn

in the Secretariat

Estado-SIDE) by replacing

all

of State Intelligence

of the military personnel with

has reversed that decision and has once again appointed

posts within SIDE. This remilitarization has not been restricted

68

s

to the lower-levels of the internal security

army colonel
second

in

community.

Menem

to the position of Subsecretary of the Interior40

command

4. 2. 3. 2 Internal

at

SIDE.

also appointed a retired

and a

retired

Navy

officer as

41

Security

The increased

military presence in

SIDE

has been paralleled by a re-introduction of

an internal security role for the armed forces which began soon
after Menem's
inauguration. Facing incredible hyperinflation and civil unrest,
particularly in the form of
looting,

Menem

issued Decree #392 which authorized a military combat role to
suppress

what the order ambiguously termed
still

"internal

commotion."

42

Reflective of the trepidation

associated with any hint of a military return to domestic vigilance,

members of both

the

Peronist and Radical parties vehemently criticized this move.

wake of the

In the

Menem

July of 1994,

terrorist

bombing of the Jewish-Argentine Mutual Association

once again decreed a greater domestic function for the

creation of the Secretariat of Security and Protection of the

Supersecretaria as

it

is

Community, or

more widely known, incorporated both

intelligence, despite legal restrictions

on

internal intelligence

civilian

by the

military. His

the

and military

military.

Although

formally a body for the combat of international terrorism, the Supersecretaria'
Patrice

McSherry

notes, in reality, "have been directed toward

domestic conflicts."
officer

and on

its

43

of the Supersecretaria

and

is

is

that

it

numerous

retired

Proceso

activities,

worker protest and other

Moreover, the head of the Supersecretaria

payroll there are

is

a former Air Force

officers.

Yet, the vital feature

was created by Menem, without congressional approval,

solely under his personal authority.
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in

4. 2. 3. 3

Manipulating the Budget

Numerous
Brazil

scholars have concluded that the military in
nations such as Argentina or

no longer are

factors in politics because of decreased
budgetary outlays. 44

as the Brazilian case highlighted, official budget
civil-military balance.

Menem

has

shown

manipulated the national appropriations

The
1

military budget shrunk

.9% of GDP

in

numbers can be a deceptive

he

that

in line

well aware of that

indicator of the

phenomenon and has

with the military's renewed internal

GDP in

from 3.9% of

is

However,

Menem was

1989 when

1992, during a period of impressive growth

role.

inaugurated to

domestic output making

in

45
the military's appropriation smaller than the statistics bear
out.
Like Collor in Brazil

maintained a "secret budget,"

Menem has

compensated for the military

who

financial shortfall

by

increasing the security community's outlays over the objections of the
congress. In 1992

SIDE

received (U.S.)$1 15 million and

had risen

to

(U.S.)$250 million;

the highest allocation to

4.2.4 "Unequal Civilian

SIDE

in the difficult

30% more

economic time of 1995

than authorized by the legislature.

By

during Alfonsm's tenure was (U.S.)$54.5 million

contrast,

in

1989.

46

Accommodation"

While Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco both looked
ally in dealing

that figure

with a fractious party structure

to the military as a national

in the legislature,

Menem's

rationale for

appealing to the armed forces cannot be based upon the same institutional weaknesses.

Argentina has long had a history of strong party identification, rather than the
interested, rational choice

system

Wendy

Hunter describes Brazilian parties

Furthermore, Menem's party currently holds a majority

in the congress.

negotiations with the military draw upon his political thought.

He

as.

Instead

Menem's

did not merely re-

introduce the military to an internal security function, he did so making sure

70

self-

it

was under

his direct control.

Menem now

had the physical power

to

misunderstandings" so as to return Argentine society
to

Of course,
a-vis the
set

of

armed

many

the great

forces.

dilemma

Menem’s

for Argentina

mediate social
its

state of

the future of

is

"harmony."

Menemista

caudillo - like approach to democracy plays into
the mind-

within military. Atilio Boron's tripartite model
outlining Menemista thought

emphasizes the piesident

s

Aristotelian understanding of democracy.

predecessor Alfonsm, appears to believe

in a definition

one proffered by Argentine Colonel Hugo Pascarelli

egalitarianism debased democracy, for

it

was based on

war."

natural law and order;

leveled society and ignored the natural differences
rule,

has stunted any

a democratic professional military model where both democracy
and

civilian authority are respected equally.

At

best, the

Argentine armed forces can be said

represent a classical professionalist framework where civilian leadership

democracy has

unlike his

of democracy very similar to the

between human beings." 47 Accordingly, Menem, through decree

movement toward

Menem,

in justifying the "dirty

Pascarelli believed that "democracy, true democracy,

forces to

policies vis-

little

authority.

More

disturbing, however,

assume a "praetorian guard" nature around

Alfred Stepan, writing

in

obeyed, yet

the potential for the

the individual figure of

armed

Menem.

1988, forewarned of the dangers of such an occurrence:

Another vulnerability of the 'unequal
polity could

is

is

to

become transformed

accommodation' position is that a
nondemocratic civilian-headed garrison

civilian

into a

state

because of exploitation by the executive of the prerogatives the military retained in
the system. An additional basic weakness of this position is that the lack of regime
autonomy from the military implied in such high military prerogatives could
delegitimize the new democracy in the eyes of civilian and even political society. 48

The long-term consequences of this "unequal

civilian

accommodation" remain

to

be seen.

4.3 Conclusion

Both Raul Alfonsm and Carlos Menem, regardless of their contrasting

definitions

of leadership or democracy, shared a commonality: they both bargained with the armed
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Alfonsm attempted

forces.

was a victim of his

His was a time of revolution; an imprisoned people
had overthrown

history.

and

to avoid such a scenario, yet he

now demanded

retribution.

revolution traditional concepts

Alfonsm pledged
powers and

Alfonsm learned

may become

their captors

the difficult lesson that in periods of

too inflexible to deal with the changing
reality.

faithfulness to a lofty goal of democratic respect
for the separation of

for the will of the people, yet even in

what

is

world's democracies," the United States, that obedience
a call for strong leadership
cite just

nation's

(Abraham Lincoln during

considered the "model for the
times sacrificed

is at

the Civil

War and FDR

when
in

there

is

WWII to

two examples).

Carlos

Menem

learned from Alfonsm

s

weaknesses and has slowly erased much of

Argentina's international pariah status through his aggressive neo-liberal
project. Under

Menem, Argentina entered
figures, although there

cost this success

came

the

MERCOSUL trade bloc and has posted decent economic

have been periodic shocks. Nevertheless, one must ask
at.

what

at

His sweeping amnesty for the Proceso officers nullified the

Argentine judiciary's authority and his extensive rule by decree, rather than through the
congress, has done

little

for solidifying concepts of "checks

reestablishing an internal role for his

armed

forces,

and balances." Moreover, by

which were much more weak and

vulnerable than their Brazilian military counterparts,

Menem has

sacrificed a golden

opportunity to establish, perhaps permanently, a model of democratic professionalism
within the

armed

forces. Instead, his belief in delegative

democracy or

"getting the job

done," has resulted in an unsettling centralization of power. In terms of civil-military
relations, this has resulted in, to use the

McSherry term once

democracy" where the memory of authoritarianism
1

Atilio Boron, "Los

Carlos Saul
2

again, a "guardian

lingers on.

'Axiomas de Anillaco’.” La vision de la politica en el pensamiento y en
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la
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3
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increased by $41 billion; with capital flight representing
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colonel's
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"Caracteristicas
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(February

CHAPTER 5
EPILOGUE

Civil-military relations in Latin

America

in

1996 remain enigmatic. In the

late

1970's civilian governments were the exception, today they are
the norm. Based upon this

observation, one

would conclude

internal politics.

However,

that the military in Latin

America has distanced

itself

from

as Machiavelli reminds us, appearances need not
reflect reality.

Chile, an apparently thriving civilian state,

shadow of General Pinochet.

still

has not completely emerged from the

In Peru, the military actively supported President
Fujimori as

he abandoned any shred of fidelity to democratic institutions with his
auto-golpe.

Venezuela, a nation with a long twentieth-century history of military non-involvement,
experienced various military coup attempts
state of financial crisis.

In

in the 1990's as

it

Mexico, the ruling PRI has come

descended

into

its

to rely extensively

military in the mid-1990's to crush popular resistance in Chiapas.

Meanwhile

current

on the

Brazil and

Argentina, as this study has demonstrated, continue to struggle with the vestiges of military
authoritarianism.

As Jose Alvaro Moises
end of authoritarianism;
and the populace.

1

it

noted,

democracy

is

not necessarily a natural result of the

requires a concerted effort by civilian protagonists, the military

This study, more importantly than

its

exhibition of contemporary civil-

military relations, casts doubt as to the dedication of Brazilian and Argentine civilian leaders
to

pursuing democracy

.

The degree of that commitment

will, ultimately,

determine the

future of civil-military dialogue and, as a result, the future of government in those

South American

states.

Will Brazilian and Argentine leaders rely on formal democratic

norms regardless of the policy

costs or instead resort to political "arm-wrestling" with the

legislature, using the military as

answer seems

two

muscle (with unpredictable consequences)? For now, the

to favor the latter. All of the post-authoritarian presidents of Brazil

bargained with the armed forces for

political

framework. As for Argentina, Carlos

have

advantages within their nation's democratic

Menem

has taken civil-military negotiation to a

76

new

level

by not only compromising with

internal military involvement.

democratic paradigm

The

in the

the military but actually reversing legal
limitations to

These actions

question the viability of the liberal-

southern cone of the Americas.

post-authoritarian presidents of Brazil and Argentina
(particularly Franco and

Menem) have

demonstrated that democracy

achievement of

political results

Adam

democracy

(read: representational

its

worth

These leaders appear

in practice.

to

government) may be interchangeable within the same

There exist combinations where the

sufficient to counterbalance the

in

valuable as an abstract concept, yet the

Przeworksi noted, that authoritarianism (read: result-oriented
gov't) and

regime. Przeworski wrote.

Weffort added,

is

may outweigh

believe, as

what can be applied

power among many, only a means,
of democracy as an end

threat of repression

is

weakness of representational government." 2 Francisco
to

both the Argentine and Brazilian cases, that

the Brazilian political tradition, the idea that

In

call into

in itself."

democracy

is

only one possible instrument of

so deeply rooted that

is

"[i]n

it is

difficult for us to

conceive

3

Argentina Raul Alfonsfn assumed the presidency prioritizing democracy. Facing

multiplying

democracy

demands

for justice in the

form of military

trials,

Alfonsfn's

commitment

to

(the will of the people) soon proved antithetical to the requirements of his office:

determined leadership necessary

in a

period of transition. The

trials

exposed Alfonsfn

as

indecisive and diverted his attention from the nation's most pressing issue, the economy.

As an

old Brazilian proverb reminds us, "voting doesn't

Carlos Saul

fill

Menem opted for stronger leadership,

your stomach."

reflected

from the very beginning

with his relation to the military. Menem's organicist/corporatist vision allowed him to

concede on the issue of the military

trials

and focus on the nation's economy where he has

had mixed success. Menem's authoritarian
both nationally and internationally, yet

favored with re-election

in

1995 and

is

style has

in the

been criticized

in

various quarters,

most relevant arena-the electorate-he was

rumored

77

to

be seeking a third term.

In Brazil, democratic institutional weaknesses
threatened to result in legislative

chaos and gridlock. Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco, and
Fernando Henrique Cardoso

have

all, in

armed

one way or another, bypassed those flaws by directly
negotiating with the

The

forces.

results of such questionable deals

neo-liberal Real program,

which has

compensation plan for those named

mark memorable

lifted Brazil

from the abyss of

in the nation's

political success stories; not

have been the implementation of the

"disappeared"

much

inflation, as well as the

list.

Both of these events

of an incentive for fidelity to

constitutional channels.

There
making. The

are,

of course, inherent risks to executive-military bargaining and
alliance-

fact that the president,

interpretation of the national

good

be he Argentine or Brazilian, deems
that a particular bill

the objections of the congress and the courts-with the
transfers the Thomistic apology for authoritarianism

Like the military of the

1

it

be passed or decree enforced over

armed

forces'

backing-merely

from the armed forces

960’s and 70's, the president

vital for his

may

feel that

to the executive.

he alone knows what

is

best for the nation as a whole, regardless of the constitutional rights of the elected
legislature or the judiciary.

By

forging alliances with the military, the executive not only

perpetuates an active internal role for the armed forces, he also shows by his example that

democracy

is

not necessarily a priority and that there are always those individuals

not abide by constitutional constraints. In such a context,
Brazilian or Argentine officer to rationalize his
historical

power.

upheaval,

why

On

for example, the global

If,

should

this officer refrain

it

may be

own obedience

challenging for a

to constitutional limits

economy plummeted and

from exercising

who need

the nation

his traditional

was

on

his

in

poder moderador

?

the other extreme, executive-military bargaining also has the potential to bolster

military fidelity, yet, not to the office of the president, but rather to the individual in the

executive

more

at the time.

effective

Menem

ways

presidency

A financially

needy armed forces may cling

to ameliorate their plight.

Such a

to a leader

who

personalistic allegiance, as the

illustrates, creates the potential for civilian-led authoritarianism

78

finds

and

sets

,

a troubling standard for future presidents to meet.
Should

once again

curtail military prerogatives,

as the Brazilian case noted,

government, but

may

how

will the

Menem's successor decide

armed forces

to

react? Their response,

not necessarily result in a military overthrow of

very least could divert executive attention from other
areas of

at the

concern. Presidential policy could, thus, be hampered resulting

in

uncertain electoral

ramifications for the executive and his party.
In the

decade or so since government was returned

Brazil, a plethora of scholarly articles
transition

and books have been published dealing with

and consolidation of democracy.

hopefully have

shown

to civilians in Argentina

If this thesis

that consolidation in Brazil

has been

at all successful,

and
political

it

will

and Argentina remains incomplete. As

Lawrence Graham noted:

[pjolitical analysts often

use the criterion of two successive transfers of power from
civilian president to the next as sufficient to establish a consolidated democracy,
but such an assessment overlooks the problem of institutions and the power of
4
traditional elites to limit democratization

one

.

Until Brazilian and Argentine institutions are sufficiently strengthened to confront both the
after-effects of their authoritarian pasts as well as the distinct

industrialized

powers (economics, global markets, jobs,

problems of emerging

pollution, crime, drugs, etc.),

executive-military bargaining for political reality seems inevitable.
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